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NOTES
Income Splitting as a Means of Avoiding Taxes
I. INTRODUCrION
A popular belief seems to have grown up of late that, under our
present graduated income tax structure, it is almost impossible to at-
tain any great degree of wealth, that the millionaire is largely of a past
era. Present economic facts, however, contradict this belief. A news
magazine recently reported:
The U. S. still offers countless opportunities for the man who wants to
accumulate a personal net worth of one million dollars or more-and thou-
ands seize them every year. The number of U. S. millionaires, reports the
Federal Reserve Board, has swelled from 40,000 in 1958 to nearly 100,000
at present.1
It is apparent that many persons today are finding ways to avoid the
top bracket income tax rates. The methods of avoidance are nearly as
numerous as the ways to attain wealth in the first place. Conversion
of potential ordinary income into capital gain by such means as the
incorporation of an expanding enterprise or the adoption of qualified
stock option plans, is probably the most popular technique employed.
2
Eisner v. McComber3 notwithstanding, this modem-day alchemy is
not a matter of inherent right. In most instances, it is a privilege con-
ferred by Congress to further certain socially desirable policies, and it
is carefully regulated by the Treasury Department and Congress so as
to prevent abuse.4 The loss in revenue is, in the eyes of the govern-
ment, justified by certain economic or social benefits which the con-
ferred privilege is calculated to stimulate.
Not all means of avoiding the top tax brackets, however, necessarily
further a socially desirable policy. The method of income splitting, for
example, is used to distort congressional tax policy.5 "Income split-
1. Time, Dec. 3, 1965, p. 88.
2. See, e.g., note 4 infra.
3. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
4. E.g., Stock option plan, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 42-1425; Preferred stock
ballot, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 306; Stock redemption, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 302-304. See also Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains Under
the Federal Income Tax, 1913-1948, 2 NAT'L TAx J. 12 (1949).
5. Ever since Justice Holmes characterized the assignment of income as "an arrange-
ment by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they
grew," Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930), high income taxpayers have been
greatly concerned with ways to transfer the "trees" to separate related entities-i.e.,
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ting" is the dividing or filtering or radiating of income among two or
more tax entities. Two characteristics of our federal income tax struc-
ture make the tax advantages gained by income splitting axiomatic.
First, personal income taxes are graduated and a measurable increase
in annual earnings is necessarily accompanied by a correlative increase
in the amount of personal income taxes required. Thus, greater distri-
bution of high income among several tax entities results in lower in-
dividual tax rates, and therefore less ultimate aggregate tax payable.
Second, an income tax exemption is allowed for each taxable entity,
so the more diversified the distribution of income, the greater the
amount of tax exempt income. Furthermore, as a means of avoiding
high taxes, income splitting is potentially more effective than the sev-
eral available techniques employed to convert potential ordinary in-
come into capital gain. If the tax burden for a given amount of income
is split among enough entities, the aggregate tax payable can be
brought below capital gain tax on the same amount of income. Theo-
retically, because of multiple tax exemptions, the total tax payable
could even be zero.
The purpose of this note is to examine the present tax treatment of
the three most popular income splitting devices used to avoid taxes:
the family partnership, multiple trusts, and multiple corporations. In
Part II, the various congressional and judicial limits and sanctions im-
posed upon these devices will be discussed along with recently pro-
posed regulatory legislation. Part III will consist of an evaluation of
the suggested limitations upon the use of income splitting devices.
The ultimate concern of this note is to arrive at some conclusions as to
the general approach and the specific methods best suited (1) to regu-
late what are often deemed "sham"6 devices to split income and thus
avoid taxes, and at the same time (2) to reduce the great amount of
uncertainty and confusion which now exists in this field.
The three income splitting devices upon which this note focuses
have certain common elements. Principally, each is used to divide in-
come which is ordinarily taxed to a single entity among several, sepa-
rate, taxable entities, thereby achieving an income tax saving. There
are, however, also subtle differences in the way each device achieves
its tax saving. A few introductory remarks on these devices will per-
haps elucidate the more extensive discussion of them in Part II.
The family partnership is the most obvious and the most direct way
to members of the family or to closely-held corporations-and thus preserve the greatest
amount of "fruit" -within their ultimate control. The various devices employed to
accomplish, this feat may be broadly characterized as "income splitting devices."
6. For a brief discussion of the sham doctrine, as applied to income splitting devices,
see notes 126 (multiple trusts) and 203 (multiple corporations) infra and accompany-
ing text.
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to split income. It is typically a means by which high income normally
taxable wholly to the head of the family is diverted to other members
of the family by transfers to them of capital connected with the busi-
ness, thereby making the transferees partners, taxable on their shares
of the business income at lower tax rates.
The multiple trust arrangement is a method by which income
normally taxable to a single taxpayer is diverted by transfers of high-
yield property to several, separate accumulation trust entities, each
having the same beneficiary. Such an arrangement accomplishes both
a radiation and a subsequent conversion of income, which is taxable to
each trust as it is received. Multiple accumulation trusts thus may not
only split the income of the grantor, but also of the trust beneficiary.
Multiple corporation, in which, for example, several related cor-
porations may be formed to do the business previously accomplished
by a single corporation, may also achieve a tax saving, not because of
a graduated rate structure, as in the previous two devices, but because
of the 25,000 dollar surtax exemption allowed for each corporate en-
tity. Furthermore the separate 100,000 dollar minimum accumulation
earnings credit allowed for each corporation provides an additional
tax benefit. Multiple corporations are of two general types: the par-
ent-subsidiary arrangement, in which each new subsidiary corpora-
tion is created by transfers from the parent corporation; and the
brother-sister arrangement, in which sister corporations are formed by
transfers from shareholders of a single brother corporation.
7
II. THREE INCOME SPLITTING DEVICES - THEm UsEs AND THEm LIMITS
A hypothetical family spanning three generations, and involving a
prosperous, expanding business enterprise will be used from time to
time in Part II in order to illustrate the functional aspects of the three
income splitting devices to be discussed. The relevant facts are as fol-
lows:
The family is composed of the father, Horace Alger, Sr., his wife
Hilda, and their two sons-Horace, Jr., who has recently received an
advanced degree in electrical engineering, and Hal, who is presently
teaching economics at State University. Both sons are married, and
each has four children.
The father, Horace, Sr., while working faithfully for twenty years
as a research physicist for a large electronics corporation, conducted
experiments in his home workshop which eventually culminated in the
invention of a highly advanced, portable computer. His employer,
7. For studies of the area of income splitting, see BrraE, FEDERAL INCOME,




however, was unimpressed, so Horace, Sr., decided late in life to leave
the electronics corporation, apply for a patent, and go into business for
himself, manufacturing and selling his computer.
Although urged by his lawyer to incorporate his new enterprise,
Horace, Sr. said that he had "had enough of corporations," and that he
was going "to go it alone." His life savings, in addition to a large loan
were used to purchase and equip a plant for manufacturing the com-
puters and to hire three skilled employees. In the first two years ex-
penses were high, but Horace, Sr. quickly built up a market for his
computers, and during the third year, his net income began to "sky-
rocket." Horace, Jr. decided to help his father out in the new enter-
prise, and began work during this third year as both manufacturing
supervisor and sales representative.
The following year, income from the enterprise exceeded expenses
(including monthly payments on the debt and a 10,000 dollar per year
salary for Horace, Jr.) by 300,000 dollars. It was not until Horace, Sr.
filed the final installment of his income tax, however, that he suddenly
realized he had paid seventy per cent of his year's income in federal
income taxes, an amount with which he would have liked to expand
his business.
Disappointed over his lack of tax planning, Horace, Sr. returned to
his lawyer's office, seeking a way to reduce his income taxes while
keeping his income "in the family." The following alternatives with
their respective limitations, were fully explained to him.
A. The Family Partnership
One available alternative which Horace, Sr. could utilize to lower
his business income taxes, particularly if he is still adverse to incor-
porating, is to change the form of enterprise from a sole proprietorship
to a partnership, making himself, Horace, Jr., and Hal, partners.
1. History of Limitations Imposed. - The history of income tax
treatment accorded to family partnerships prior to the passage of the
1951 Internal Revenue Code is filled with abrupt changes, and re-
versals. Writers have divided this confusing era into three separate
periods."
The first includes the years prior to 1946. Before 1930, family part-
nerships, if valid under state law, were generally recognized for federal
income tax purposes, even if they were formed for no other reason than
to avoid taxes.9 In 1930, however, Lucas v. Earl0 decided that income
8. BA~n-rTr & SEAco, PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIs-LAw AND TAXATION 546 (1956);
W.LLis, HANDBOOx OF PARTN iSnn TAXAToN 426 (1957).
9. See, e.g., C. W. Crane, 19 B.T.A. 577 (1930); J. E. Briggs, 15 B.T.A. 1092
(1929); E. C. Wilson, 11 B.T.A. 963 (1928).
10. Supra note 5.
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must be taxed to the one who earns it, and a mere assignment of in-
come by a husband to his wife is not sufficient to shift the incidence of
the tax. Thereafter,1 courts began to scrutinize carefully family trans-
fers in general, and family partnerships in particular. 2 By 1944, many
courts were refusing to recognize family partnerships, even though
valid under state law, especially where the partnership was formed
by gifts to members of the family who contributed no services. 3 The
Supreme Court finally reviewed the issue in 1946 in the Tower 4 and
Lusthous'5 decisions. In Tower, the court stated:
When the existence of an alleged partnership arrangement is challenged by
outsiders, the question arises whether the partners really and truly intended
to join together for the purpose of carrying on business and sharing in the
profits or losses or both.1 6
A few pages later, it said:
There can be no question that a wife and a husband may, under certain
circumstances, become partners for tax, as for other purposes. If she either
invests capital originating with her or substantially contributes to the control
and management of the business, or otherwise performs vital additional ser-
vices, or does all these things she may be a partner .... 17
Thus, apparently the Court set out two distinctly different tests for
recognition of a family partnership - one based upon the subjective
intent of the parties, and one based upon objective standards.
During the second period - 1946 to 1949 - both the courts and the
Internal Revenue Service seized upon and assiduously applied the
objective standards test, requiring a contribution of original capital or
of vital services from each member.18 Also during this period, the
11. Ibid.
12. Family Partnerships and the Revenue Act of 1951, 61 YALE L.J. 541, 542-43
(1952).
13. W. P. Sewell, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 106 (1944); R. W. Carfield, 3 CCH Tax
Ct. Mere. 123 (1944). For Tax Court decisions in the same year that seemed to
follow conflicting principles, see J. D. Johnston, Jr., 3 T.C. 799 (1944); Robert P.
Sherer, 3 T.C. 776 (1944).
14. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946). Tower owned 90% of the stock
in a close corporation. He gave his wife a portion of the stock, on condition that
when the corporation was liquidated, she would transfer her portion of the assets to
a partnership, in which she was to be a limited partner. She contributed no appreciable
services.
15. Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293 (1946). Here, the husband sold his
wife a one-half interest in his business (operated as a sole proprietorship) for $100,000,
after which he gave her $50,000 to be used for partial payment, the balance to be
paid by her out of further profit. Her services to the business were nominal.
16. 327 U.S. at 286-87.
17. Id. at 290.
18. See, e.g., Larson v. Kramer, 84 F. Supp. 313 (D. Conn. 1949); Sam Averbuch,




Revenue Act of 1948 was passed, and for the first time, under section
301 (d), a husband and wife were permitted to file a joint return, com-
puting their income tax as if each had received half of their combined
income.19 This provision nullified the tax saving of a husband-wife
partnership, but failed to lessen the mounting litigation concerning
family partnerships involving children 20
In 1949, the Supreme Court decided Commissioner v. Culbertson,21
which began the third period. There the Court specifically disavowed
the strict "objective standards" test, stating that original capital and
vital services were only two factors to be considered. The new pro-
posed test was: "whether, considering all the facts . . . the parties in
good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join together
in the present conduct of the enterprise."' It is not surprising that
more confusion resulted in applying this test, based upon subjective
criteria, than the previous "objective standards" test.2 Courts began
looking to a variety of factors in order to ascertain whether the tax-
payers formed their partnership "in good faith" or "for a business pur-
pose," but there was little agreement as to the weight accorded any
one factor.24
2. Present Limitations. - In order to settle the many judicial dis-
putes over the income tax consequences of family partnerships formed
by gifts of capital (frequently to the donor's minor children), Con-
gress, in 1951, set its own standards for recognition and taxation of
family partnership income. It amended the definition' of "partnership"
to read as follows:
A person shall be recognized as a partner for income tax purposes if he owns
a capital interest in a partnership in which capital is a material income-
producing factor, whether or not such interest was derived by purchase or
gift from any other person.25
And in a new section, namely 704(e), it delineated the limits of a
"family partnership":
(e) Family Partnerships
(2) In the case of any partnership interest created by gift, the dis-
19. Revenue Act of 1948 ch. 168, § 301(d), 62 Stat. 114, (now INT. REv. CoD or
1954, § 2(a)).
20. I BAm-r & SEAGO, op. cit. supra note 8, at 549.
21. 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
22. Id. at 742.
23. E.g., Compare Le Sage v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1949) and
Moore v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1948), with Graber v. Commissioner,
171 F.2d 32 (10th Cir. 1948) and Kent v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1948).
24. See Income Taxation of Family Partnerships, 50 CoLm-. L. REV. 68 (1950) for
a discussion of judicial decisions under the Culbertson rule.
25. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 340, 65 Stat. 511.
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tributive share of the donee under the partnership agreement
shall be includible in his gross income, except to the extent that
such share is determined without allowance of reasonable com-
pensation for services rendered to the partnership by the donor,
and except to the extent that the portion of such share attribut-
able to donated capital is proportionately greater than the share
of the donor attributable to the donor's capital.2
Both of these sections were re-enacted in the 1954 Code,2 7 and a "fourth
period" of the family partnership has continued from 1951 to the pres-
ent.
Congress' objective in passing the new family partnership legisla-
tion was, principally, to make the general rules for taxation of income
earned from property or business applicable to family partnership in-
come. More specifically, it was to tax income from property to the real
owner, and to tax income from services to the person rendering such
services. 28 The most significant element of the 1951 legislation lies in
its rejection of the confusing "subjective intent" test as expressed in
Culbertson, and its substitution of an objective criterion, based upon
general tax principles, to determine when family partnerships are to be
recognized for income tax purposes. The Committee report stated:
Your committee's amendment makes it clear that, however the owner of a
partnership interest may have acquired such interest, the income is taxable
to the owner, if he is the real owner. -If the ownership is real, it does not
matter what motivated the transfer to him .... 29
The regulations interpreting section 704(e) set forth the require-
ments for income tax recognition of the family partnership formed by
gifts of capital: (1) capital must account for a "substantial" amount of
gross income to the business in order to be a "material income produc-
ing factor," and (2) the transfer of a capital interest to the new partner
must be complete.30 The focus is upon the great multitude of factors
to be considered for determining when there has finally been a com-
plete transfer. Thus, according to the regulations, certain controls
retained by the donor, such as control over distribution of income,
31
over essential assets,32 or disproportionate control over management,
33
may vitiate the partnership for tax purposes, although no one of these
26. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 3406, 65 Stat. 511 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 704(e) (2)).
27. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 704(e) (2).
28. See House Ways and Means Committee, Revenue Act of 1951, H. R. REP. No,
586, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. 32 (1951).
29. Ibid.
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(1) (iii),(iv) (1956).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii) (a) (1956).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(c) (1956).
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(d) (1956).
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factors in conclusive. Other factors helpful in determining whether
the donee actually owns a capital interest in the partnership, for pur-
poses of section 704(e), include: whether the donee participates in
management;3 whether he is held out as a partner;35 and even whether
there is a tax avoidance motive behind the transfer.36 Once a valid
partnership is established, section 704(e) (2) provides guidelines to
assure the proper allocation of the family partnership income. It al-
lows the donee of capital to be taxed on his distributive share, after
allowance has been made for compensation for the donor's services and
the share attributable to the donor's capital.37 The regulations inter-
pret this section to mean that priority should be given to the share at-
tributable to the donor's services, requiring it to be deducted before
computing the donee's share of partnership income.m
3. Advantages and Use as an Income Splitting Device Today.3 Un-
der the 1951 legislation, formation of a section 704(e) family partner-
ship by distributing gifts of capital interests to members of the donor's
family is virtually certain to split the income of the donor. However,
formation of a closely-held corporation, and distribution of stock among
family members, may well accomplish the same result just as effec-
tively, and even though many other tax and non-tax factors will enter
into the ultimate choice of business form, there will be no imposition of
the limitations required under section 704(e) .40 While that section
gives fairly definite guidelines for income taxation of family partner-
ships, strictly from the standpoint of income splitting, the corporate
form provides a more certain means of spreading income among share-
holding members of the family. The price for such, however, is the
so-called double tax on corporate income - once at the corporate level
and again at the shareholder level. But this can be avoided by a sub-
chapter S election by the corporation, which will be discussed later as
an alternative to the family partnership.4'
Turning again to the predicament of Horace Alger, Sr., one can
readily see that using the family partnership is one method that he can
employ to reduce his taxes on business income. Since Horace, Jr. per-
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2) (iv) (1956).
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2)(vi) (1956).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (x) (1956).
37. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 704(e)(2).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(3)(i)(b) (1956). See Beck, Use of the Family
Partnership as an Operating Device - The New Regulations, N.Y.U. 12th INST. ON FED.
TAx, 603, 608-28 (1954) for an analysis of the family partnership regulations.
39. For a recent discussion of this area, see Strecker, When Will the Corporate Form
Save Taxes?, 18 VA-XD. L. REv. 1695 (1965). See also Caplin, Partnership or Sub Cor-
poration? A Check List of the Tax Factors in the Choice, 12 J. TAXATON 32 (1960).
40. Ibid. But see note 62 infra.
41. See note 61 infra and accompanying text.
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forms substantial services for the business, there is no problem in quali-
fying him as a partner. However, Horace, Sr. might also like to give
his other son, Hal, an interest in his lucrative enterprise. Although Hal
might be able to perform some services in the capacity of business
advisor, a gift of capital under section 704(e) will manifestly be neces-
sary to assure Hal a substantial partnership interest. This might be
accomplished by a transfer of the manufacturing plant and equipment
to both Hal and Horace, Jr. as tenants in common.
In order to maximize chances of income tax recognition of the family
partnership, several precautions might be taken.42 First, the agreement
should recite the percentile share of earnings for each partner. In ad-
dition, it should state that reasonable compensation for services per-
formed by Horace, Sr. and Horace, Jr. was considered in computing
their respective shares, and that Hal's share represents that portion of
the partnership income attributable to his one-half interest in the busi-
ness capital. Another wise precaution is to incorporate the language of
the regulations under 704(e) into the agreement, particularly with
reference to the partners' participation in management; 43 freedom to
withdraw their distributable share of earnings;4 and right to withdraw
from the partnership altogether.45
Assuming that the partnership shares recited in the agreement are
one-half for Horace, Jr., one-fourth for Horace, Sr., and one-fourth for
Hal, and assuming further that the enterprise produces 300,000 dollars
of net income for the second straight year, Horace, Sr. will pay ap-
proximately 30,570 dollars46 in federal income tax, as opposed to the
180,980 dollars47 paid the previous year when he was sole proprietor.
The total tax saving, including the additional taxes now incurred by
the two sons, is 42,860 dollars annually.48
(a) Use of Trusts in the Family Partnership. - The income tax
saving afforded by the above family partnership is significant, but in
order to realize the maximum tax advantages from a family partner-
ship, the trust device is often used. The regulations recognize that a
trustee may be a partner in a family partnership where the trustee is
either independent of the grantor or actively represents the benefici-
aries in a fiduciary capacity.49
To illustrate how trusts are used, we will return to the Alger family.
42. See suggestions in Beck, supra note 38, at 625-28.
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2) (iv) (1956).
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2) (ii)(a) (1956).
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(b) (1956).
46. Computed according to 1965 rates for joint returns, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
I(a).
47. ibid.
48. Horace, Jr. will pay $76,980; Hal, $30,570 annually. Ibid.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2) (vii) (1956).
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Horace, Sr., delighted at the prospect of splitting his business income
among members of his family by gifts of capital, might begin to
wonder why he should not extend these gifts to his eight grandchildren
instead of merely to his two sons. There would be two principal ad-
vantages in making the eight grandchildren partners. First, such a
plan obviously will spread the income out even further than the three-
man partnerships described above, thus saving a greater amount of
tax dollars. Second, an even more significant advantage may be that
this plan will help to reduce the property in the estates of Horace, Sr.
and his sons, thus "skipping a generation" for estate tax purposes. Also,
Horace, Sr. will be allowed 36,000 dollars more in gift exemptions by
transferring the property to his eight grandchildren rather than to his
two sons.50
The regulations state that unless minors are capable of managing
their own partnership interests, they will not be recognized as partners
for income tax purposes.51 One possible way to surmount this difficulty
is to make the minors limited partners. However, family partnerships
involving minors whose interests are not protected by any fiduciary are
often looked upon with suspicion by the courts.52 Nevertheless, as
above stated the regulations also recognize that trustees can be mem-
bers of a family partnership. 53 Thus, perhaps a more advisable method
for Horace, Sr. to include the grandchildren in the family partnership
is to set up eight separate trusts for them, thereby dividing that por-
tion of the partnership income attributable to the property transferred
to the trustee among eight separate taxable entities. Each trust instru-
ment could provide for accumulation of income or distribution for non-
support items to further the education and maintain the standard of
living of the beneficiary until he attains majority, at which time all
accumulated income and corpus (i.e., the beneficiary's legal interest
in the trust property) will be distributed to the beneficiary.
54
The sons, Horace, Jr. and Hal, could be made trustees. This course,
however, would leave the partnership vulnerable to attack by the Com-
missioner on the ground that the trustees are amenable to the donor's
will, and thus possibly cause the income attributable to the trust prop-
50. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2503(b), 2513.
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (viii) (1956).
52. See, e.g., Pflugradt v. United States, 310 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1962). See also
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e) (2) (iv) (1956).
53. Supra note 49. For cases in which trusts for minors were held to be valid, see,
S. H. Hartman, 43 T.C. 105 (1964); P. Pearlstone, 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9360 (W.D.
Texas 1960); J. Smith, 32 T.C. 1261 (1959).
54. These provisions will assure that Horace, Jr. and Hal will not be taxed on the
trust income expended for the beneficiaries. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 677(b). The
ultimate distributions of the trust property, including accumulated income, will be tax
free to the beneficiaries. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 665(b) (1).
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erty to be taxed to Horace, Sr.55 To avoid this problem, an indepen-
dent trustee should be appointed. He probably should be made a
limited partner so that (1) the trusts will be protected against un-
limited liability, and (2) control and management will be retained by
the partners actively engaged in the business. The regulations specifi-
cally recognize limited partners in the family partnership and require
only that state law be complied with; that the transfer be complete;
and that, in allocating partnership income, consideration be given to
the fact that the risks taken by limited partners are less than those
taken by general partners.56
Not only does the trust device in a family partnership which in-
cludes minors provide a more reliable means to split income, and thus
lower income taxes, but other benefits also result. First, the terms of
the trusts specifically exempt the grantor from income taxation on the
trust property57 and likewise exempt the property from being included
in his gross estate.58 Second, since the trust distributions are within
one of the exceptions to the throwback rules, the distributions are tax
free.59 A further advantage in using trusts, as opposed to direct trans-
fers, in the family partnership lies in the possibility of resorting to
multiple trusts, which will be discussed in Section C.
4. Alternatives to the Family Partnership. - The family partnership
is, of course, only one method of splitting business income. Similar
results may be achieved by using at least two other devices: the Sub-
chapter S election, which, as stated above, is available to the corporate
form of business, and the gift and lease back, which may be used by
a proprietorship or a partnership. As stated earlier, a large variety of
tax and non-tax factors enter into the ultimate choice of a business
form.60 The focus here is only upon the single factor of income split-
ting.
(a) The Subchapter S Election. - In the event that Horace, Sr. de-
cides to incorporate his business, income splitting would be simply a
matter of transferring shares of stock to his children and grandchildren
and later distributing the stock dividends. As noted earlier, however,
this plan entails a "double tax" on the same income, 'once on the
55. INT. 11Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 674. However, § 674(d) provides an exception if
the power of the trustees to distribute, apportion, or accumulate income is limited by
an ascertainable standard.
56. Supra note 52.
57. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-77. It provides for accumulation of income or
distribution for non-support items limited by an ascertainable standard, with no power
to control, administer or revoke retained by the grantor, and distribution of accumulated
income and corpus as each child reaches majority.
58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2036, 2038.
59. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 665(b)(1).
60. See note 39 supra.
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corporate income and again on the shareholders' dividends. Other dis-
advantages of the corporate form include taxable liquidation, unfavor-
able loss treatment, and the threat of the accumulated earnings tax.
Subchapter S of the Code6' removes all of these objections for certain
defined corporations.
62
When a corporation, by the unanimous consent of its shareholders,
6 3
makes a subchapter S election, the business continues to be treated as
a corporation for most tax purposes. There are, however, four impor-
tant exceptions. The "subchapter S corporation" is not subject to
corporate income tax.64 The shareholders are taxed currently on divi-
dends and undistributed net income of the corporation.65 Losses of the
corporation "pass through" to the shareholders, and may be used to
offset their ordinary income.66 Capital gains to the corporation also
pass through, retaining their character in the hands of the share-
holders.67 These four exceptions permit a corporation to operate as a
partnership for most income tax purposes, and thereby present to many
businesses a method of splitting income more advantageously than the
family partnership.
Subchapter S is not without its limitations and drawbacks, however.
Election is limited to the "small business corporation," which the Code
defines as a domestic corporation, not a member of any affiliated group
(not a subsidiary 80 per cent owned and controlled by a separate
parent corporation), having only one class of stock, and having no
more than ten shareholders, no one of whom is a non-resident alien
and none of whom is a corporation, partnership, or trust.68 Two other
prerequisites for a subchapter S election that limit its availability, and
that are not mentioned in the sections defining the "small business
corporation," are the requirements that less than twenty per cent of
the subchapter S corporation's income be personal holding company
income (which includes rent and interest) 69 and that less than eighty
per cent of the business income be from outside the United States.
70
Another factor that may persuade a businessman to split his income by
61. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-77.
62. For a discussion of subchapter S. see Stein, Optional Taxation of Closely Held
Corporations Under the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 HmAv. L. REV. 710
(1959). See also Caplin, supra note 40. To curb the use of subchapter S as a way
around the family partnership rules of § 704(e), § 1375(c) provides for allocation of
dividends among family members if necessary to reflect services rendered by them.
63. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(a).
64. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(b) (1).
65. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1373(a).
66. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1374(a).
67. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1375(a)(1).
68. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 1371(a).
69. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 1372(e)(5).
70. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e) (4).
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use of the family partnership rather than the subchapter S corporation
is the possibility of unilateral termination, such as the transfer by a
single share holder of his stock to a trust.7 1 In the event of such termi-
nation, there is the possibility that undistributed net income may be
taxed twice, once when earned and again if and when received after
the Subchapter S election is terminated.7
(b) Gift and Lease Back. - A method by which Horace, Sr. could
lower his income taxes and yet continue to operate his enterprise as
sole proprietor is to transfer the plant and equipment to a trust for the
benefit of his grandchildren, and subsequently lease the plant back
from the trustee. Horace, Sr. could thereby deduct the rent (which is
paid to his grandchildren's trusts) from his business income, and thus
lower his taxes and achieve a similar income splitting effect to that of
the family partnership.7 3
At one time there was considerable disagreement as to whether the
gift (or sale) and lease back device could or should produce the de-
sired tax effects.74 In two landmark cases involving the question
whether rent deductions should be allowed in the gift and lease back
situation, the taxpayers prevailed.7 5 In a third case, however, the de-
ductions were disallowed.7 6 Yet a subsequent shift in position by the
majority of the Tax Court 7 and acquiescence by the Commissioner
seemed to establish the principle that "if business property were given
to an independent trustee and the property was then leased back at a
reasonable rent, the donor would be allowed to deduct the rent paid
to the trustee."79
Three recent cases80 have reopened litigation in this field. Each in-
volved the gift of an office-building in trust by a physician to his
71. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(e).
72. See Brrx.nFn, FEDEAL INCOmE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS,
416-17 (1959).
73. It should be recognized, however, that a partnership interest based upon owner-
ship of capital might result in much more income to the owner than the fair rental value
of the property, and thus produce a greater amount of income splitting than the sale
and lease back device. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-(3)(i)(b) (1956).
74. See Carey, Current Problems in Sale, or Gift, and Lease-Back Transactions, 29
TAxEs 662, 669 (1951); Note, The Gift and Leaseback: A New Tax Avoidance Gim-
mick, 59 YAI.E L. J. 1529 (1950).
75. Deductions allowed in Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
76. White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951).
77. Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954) (four judges dissenting).
78. John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956), acq., 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 6.
79. Oliver, Income Tax Aspects of Gifts and Leasebacks of Business Property in
Trust, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 21 (1965).
80. Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 882 U.S. 814
(1965); Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962);.Alden B. Oakes, 44
T.C. 524 (1965).
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children, with a lease back from the trustee. Significantly, in each the
donor transferred the property to a short-term trust with reversion
after ten years.8' In two of the cases rent deductions were disallowed;
one on the ground that the transaction was merely an assignment of
income,82 and the other because the transaction involved no business
purpose,8 and thus the rent paid was not an "ordinary and necessary
incident in the conduct of the business."84 The third case, Alden B.
Oakes,85 involved an eleven-year trust, with an independent trustee,
and reversion to the grantor's wife instead of to the grantor. The rent
deductions were allowed in this case. Judge Dawson, who also wrote
the Tax Court's opinion in Van Zandt, held that the fact that there was
no business purpose was not controlling; "actual independence" of the
trustee is a "pivotal factor."86 Another important factor in the tax-
payer's favor was that the reversionary (or remainder) interest was
held by his wife, rather than by him.
Thus, although the section 704(e) family partnership may often
split a greater fraction of business income than the gift and lease back
(which cannot split an amount in excess of the reasonable rent of the
property transferred), the latter device has the advantage of a more
limited commitment when the short-term trust is used. It is extremely
doubtful that the trustee of a short-term trust would be eligible as a
partner in a family partnership since the requirement of real ownership
by the donee would not be met.87 The short term trust is, however, by
no means certain to succeed even in the gift and lease back situation
since the rent deduction, if disallowed, will be taxed twice-once to the
grantor and again to the trustee.88
5. Proposed Legislation. - Unlike multiple trusts and multiple cor-
porations, relatively little has been written about the family partner-
ship during the past decade, and the number of reported cases in this
area has also declined. This waning of interest over the family partner-
ship is probably due to several factors. First, Congress' rules, set out
in the 1951 code,89 which base tax recognition of partnership interests
created by gifts of capital upon the completeness of the transfer rather
than upon the intent of the donor, are relatively unambiguous and
easy to apply. The legislation seems fair and has worked infinitely
81. A short term trust is an exception to the general rule that a revocable trust is
taxable to the grantor. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 673(a), 674(b)(2).
82. Van Zandt v. Commissioner, supra note 80.
83. Hall v. United States, supra note 80.
84. 341 F.2d at 443.
85. Supra note 80.
86. Ibid.
87. Tieas. Reg. § 1,704-1(e) (2) (1956).
88. See Oliver, supra note 79, at 46.
89. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 704(e).
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better than the various judicial rules formulated during the pre-1951
era, both from the standpoint of providing clear and equitable guide-
lines for tax treatment of family partnership income and of preventing
undue tax avoidance.
Another reason for the waning interest in family partnerships is
the tremendous increase in popularity of the corporate form. A whole
host of tax saving advantages, open only to the corporate form of busi-
ness account for this present popularity, such as qualified deferred
compensation" and stock option plans9' and many sections giving
special economic advantages to the small business corporationf 2 Also,
as has been mentioned, the subchapter S election93 allows many pro-
prietorships to adopt the corporate form and split income by transfer-
ring shares to family members with substantially the same income tax
effects as if the business were a partnership.
Nevertheless, the family partnership continues to be used today as
an effective income splitting device,94 and no serious proposals have
lately been made to change the legislation that has regulated family
partnerships for the past fifteen years.
C. Multiple Trusts
The multiple trust, referred to here as a device to split income, most
often involves a series of separate accumulation or "complex" trusts,
set up by a single grantor for a single beneficiary. To illustrate one
way this device might be used, we will again return to the Alger
family. Let us assume that Horace, Sr. decides to transfer the plant
and equipment used in his business to trusts for his eight grandchil-
dren, with the trustee as a limited partner and one-sixteenth of the
partnership income attributable to each trust. It is obvious that if the
partnership income continues to increase, even though a large portion
of the increase undoubtedly will have to be attributed to the services
of Horace, Sr. and Horace, Jr. (particularly if the trustee is a limited
partner), the income tax rates for each trust will climb into corre-
spondingly higher brackets. Thus, in order to lower the taxes payable
by trustee, and thus preserve for the beneficiaries as much of the
partnership income attributable to the trust property as possible,
Horace, Sr. might create three separate trusts for each grandchild in-
stead of just one. This arrangement will result in twenty-four separate
trusts, each taxable on only one-forty-eighth of the partnership income.
90. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 401-07.
91. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 421-25.
92. E.g., additional first year depreciation allowances, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §
179; three year net operating carryback, § 172(b); losses on small business stock, § 1244.
93. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
94. See note 52 supra and the authorities cited therein.
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Where the total income is high, a considerable tax saving will result,
due both to the imposition of lower tax rates on the income attribut-
able to each trust, and the additional 1600 dollars exempt from income
annually.9 5
It can readily be seen that, while the family partnership is a device
by which the donor of capital can lower his own income taxes, the
multiple trust device may be used to effect a tax saving on the next
level of income - that is, to lower taxes paid by the donees. The mul-
tiple trust device is not restricted to use in the family partnership, how-
ever. Numerous and often elaborate ways have been devised to utilize
multiple trusts to avoid taxes, some of which will be considered below.
1. Past and Present Limitations Imposed - (a). Legislative Limita-
tions. - Under the early tax law, the trust had no separate, taxable
status, all income merely being taxed to the beneficiary.96 It soon be-
came apparent, however, that accumulation trusts with several con-
tingent beneficiaries could be used to avoid income taxes altogether,
since a taxable beneficiary could not be ascertained. To close this
loophole, Congress amended the law to make the trustee a separate,
taxable person.91 With the era of the graduated income tax, this
amendment created a new "loophole," however, in the form of ac-
cumulation trusts, and particularly multiple accumulation trusts.
Initially there were two central aspects of this loophole. First, as
demonstrated above, multiple accumulation trusts could be used to
accumulate income, potentially taxable to the grantor or beneficiary at
high rates at the lower rates of the separate trust entities.98 Second, the
ultimate distributions of the accumulated trust income were taxable to
the beneficiary only to the extent of the untaxed trust income in the
year of distribution, thus completing the transformation from high to
low bracket income. Also, often the trustee could deem at least part
of this distribution corpus rather than income, and to that extent the
beneficiary would be taxed at the more favorable capital gain rate.
At one time Congress imposed no limitations whatsoever upon the
use of multiple accumulation trusts, even though the Treasury Depart-
ment has been aware of the tax avoidance possibilities inherent in this
95. Each accumulation trust is allowed a $100 income tax exemption. See INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 642(b).
96. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 11(D) 38 Stat. 114. See Note, Multiple Trusts
and the Minimization of Federal Taxes, 40 CoLum. L. REv. 309 (1940).
97. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(b) 39 Stat. 756. U.S. Treas. Reg. 33, Art. 27,
29.
98. In Hearings before Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 278 (1937) is an example of the tax savings possibilities of accumulation of
income in multiple trusts. By using 56 accumulation trusts, 4 separate, related grantors
were able to save $701,227 in taxes over a three year period.
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device since before 1937.99 Strangely, today there are still no direct
prohibitions against the first aspect of the multiple accumulation de-
vice-i.e., the right to accumulate income in multiple trusts.1°0 The
second aspect of multiple accumulation trusts-tax free distribution of
accumulated income-however, was recently subjected to a direct, but
not very far-reaching statutory restriction. 01
Turning first to the right to accumulate taxable income in multiple
trusts, the only restrictions upon the grantor's right to set up such an
arrangement are embodied in the general Code provisions for taxation
of income to grantor trusts.0 2 These sections were passed by Congress
in order to prevent a grantor from shifting the incidence of taxation on
income earned from property in a "Clifford-type" trust - whether of
the accumulation or mandatory distribution variety - while retaining
substantial incidents of ownership over the trust property.1°3 They
define the specific powers and interests which, if retained by the
grantor, would cause him to be taxable upon the trust income. As long
as the burden of income tax on the trust property is shifted away from
the grantor by compliance with these Code sections, then his right to
provide for accumulation of taxable income in multiple trusts for a
single beneficiary has never been restricted by Congress.1' 4
The first legislation directed specifically to limiting the tax avoidance
capabilities of accumulation trusts was passed in 1937.105 Congres-
sional hearings conducted during that year revealed that six families
had evaded a total of 1,891,822.88 dollars through the use of 98 sepa-
rate accumulation trusts. 6 For example, one taxpayer created on a
single day sixty-four trusts, with his wife and three children as bene-
ficiaries, and transferred 277,500 shares of Pan-American stock to the
trusts. The stock was immediately sold, and by having sixty-four trusts
instead of just four, the capital gains tax on the sale was reduced by
$485,000 dollars.1' 7
Strangely enough, the only legislation to result from these hearings
99. See note 106 infra and accompanying text.
100. See Ervin, Multiple Accumulation Trusts and Related Problems Under the In-
come Tax, 29 So. CAL. L.R. 402, 405 (1956).
101. See note 111 infra and accompanying text.
102. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-77.
103. See Pedrick, Grantor Powers and Estate Taxation: The Ties That Bind, 54 Nw.
U. L. REV. 527 (1959).
104. Congress has made this right less attractive, however, by passage of the "throw-
back rule." See note 111 infra and accompanying text. See also Ervin, supra note 100,
at 405; Soter, Federal Taxation Aspects of Multiple Accumulation Trusts, 31 U. CIc.
L. REV. 351, 363-84 (1962).
105. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, ch. 2, § 163(b) 53 Stat. 67. For corresponding section
in the present code, see note 95 supra.
106. See Hearings, supra note 98.
107. Id. at 264, cited in Soter, supra note 104, at 354. See also Fillman & Barnet,
Recent Proposals on the Taxation of Estates and Trusts, 41 B.U.L. REV. 35, 36 (1961).
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was a reduction of the accumulation trust's income tax exemption from
1,000 dollars to 100 dollars.0 8 This legislation restricted one aspect of
the tax avoidance capabilities inherent in the accumulation of income
in multiple trusts (multiple tax exemptions), but it left completely un-
restricted the right to accumulate potentially high bracket income in
multiple, low-bracket trust entities for a single beneficiary. One pos-
sible explanation for this failure may lie in the statement of Represen-
tative Vinson, a member of the tax committee, and later to become
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, to the effect that the gift tax is a
sufficient check on the tax avoidance possibilities of multiple trusts.'
It should be noted here that the gift tax is always a factor to consider
when making inter vivos transfers. However, the gift tax is the same,
whether property is transferred to a single trust, or to multiple trusts
for the same beneficiary. 110 Thus, it is difficult to comprehend how the
gift tax restricts the multiple trust device.
The only other legislative restrictions to be imposed upon the tax
avoidance capabilities of the accumulation trust was directed to re-
stricting the second aspect of this device-tax free distribution of ac-
cumulated income. This restriction, passed in 1954, is called the "five
year throwback rule.""' Like the reduction of the income tax exemp-
tion, this limitation applies to single and multiple accumulation trusts.
The throwback rule does not impose any restriction on accumulating
income in trusts. It does, however, provide that whenever distribution
is made to the beneficiary of an accumulation trust, the beneficiary is
taxable on the "distributable net income" to the trust during the five
years prior to distribution. The term "distributable net income" is a
term of art, formulated by Congress principally for two reasons: first,
to prevent the trustee's discretionary allocation of distributions, among
beneficiaries to either income or corpus, and thereby to provide a ra-
tional basis on which to compute income taxation of trust distributions;
and second, to provide the maximum distribution deduction that a
trustee may take in computing trust income."
2
The five-year throwback rule, in bringing the trust's distributable net
income during the prior five years into the distributee's taxable income,
effectively restricts frequent, tax-free distributions of accumulation
108. Supra note 105.
109. "[U]nder the law whenever a gift is made, it is not in the picture as to wlt
income the gift will produce. The gift tax settles that. Under the law a person has a
right to give away his property, if he pays the gift tax." Statement by Rep. Vinson,
Hearings, supra note 98, at 286.
110. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-2 (1958).
111. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 666.
112. On the effect of the throwback rule on multiple trusts, see Ervin, supra note
100, at 406; Soter, supra note 104, at 369-74; Note, Taxation of Multiple Trusts, 24
U. Cm. L. REv. 156 (1956).
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trusts, whether multiple or single. It can readily be seen that, although
the multiple trust might be a marvelous method to lower taxes on high
income property, no one will get the benefit of the tax saving unless
distributions are eventually made. Thus, it would seem that the throw-
back rule would discourage the use of multiple trusts merely to split
income and avoid taxes. Such is not the case, however, simply because
the throwback rule is so easily avoided.113 Avoidance is generally ac-
complished through one of the rule's five exceptions, which exempt
from it's operation: (1) accumulation distributions accumulated be-
fore the birth or during the minority of the beneficiary;" 4 (2) distri-
butions for emergency needs;" 5 (3) certain periodic distributions of
pre-1954 trusts;" 6 (4) accumulations for a nine-year period, distrib-
uted in complete liquidation of the trust, if no property was trans-
ferred to the trust during the nine-year-period;" 7 and (5) accumula-
tion distributions not in excess of 2000 dollars." 8
Today, there are still no direct statutory restrictions upon intentional
tax avoidance by the use of multiple accumulation trusts. Further-
more, as discussed above, the only indirect limitations are the require-
ments that the grantor relinquish enough incidents of ownership and
control over the trust property to himself escape taxation on its in-
come, and that any distribution of accumulated income to the bene-
ficiary, if not within the several exceptions to the rule, be subject to
the five-year throwback rule.
The present status of multiple accumulation trusts as an income
splitting device, however, is extremely tenuous. This device has lately
been under the close scrutiny of Congress and the courts, and the rules
applicable to multiple trusts are almost certain to undergo extensive
revision in the near future. The Treasury's interest in multiple trusts
as a tax avoidance device, so apparent thirty years ago,119 was revived
in 1956,120 and led to the introduction of a bill in Congress directed
specifically against the use of multiple trusts to avoid taxes.1 1 This bill
will be discussed below.
(b). Court-Made Limitations. - The method traditionally used by
113. See Ervin, supra note 100, at 406.
114. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 665(b)(1).
115. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 655(b) (2).
116. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 665(b) (3).
117. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 665(b) (4).
118. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 665(b).
119. See Hearings, supra note 98.
120. See STAFFS OF Jon-r COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION AND THE
TREAsuRy DEPARTMIENT, 84TH CONG., 2D Sass., LIsT OF SUBSTANTIVE UNINTENDED
BENEFrrs AND HAnDSHS FOR TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS AcT OF 1957, 8 (Comm. Print
1956).
121. See note 152 infra.
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courts to determine income tax consequences of multiple trusts merely
involved construction of the trust instrument to determine how many
trusts the grantor intended to create.'22 Where the grantor manifested
an intent in the trust instrument to create multiple trusts, even when
the trusts were created solely to avoid taxes, courts have usually up-
held the separate trust entities for tax purposes.'23 A 1954 decision
written by Judge Learned Hand modified the "intent test" by requir-
ing that the grantor must not only intend multiple trusts, but also he
must comply with the form required by local law in order to effectuate
this intent. 2 4 This test is generally satisfied when the grantor executes
a separate instrument for each trust.125
At least one court has gone even farther. In Boyce v. United
States,126 the taxpayer engaged in a rather risky attempt to split in-
come, involving both a sale and lease back and a multiple trust ar-
rangement. This optimistic taxpayer, a physician, executed ninety
identical inter vivos instruments, each naming his son as beneficiary
and each having the same trustee. To these trusts, the taxpayer trans-
ferred ninety separate checks, totaling 17,740 dollars, and the next day,
in consideration of the 17,740 dollars, transferred his office building to
the trustee and immediately leased the building back. Thereafter, the
taxpayer paid 400 dollars a month rent to the trustee, which the trustee
allocated among the ninety trusts. After ten months, distributions
were made to the beneficiary by ninety different checks, totaling 4000
dollars. In subsequent years, however, the trustee was less careful in
preserving the form of the multiple trust arrangement, withdrawing
distributions on behalf of the beneficiary in lump sums.
In spite of the fact that the taxpayer's intent to create multiple
trusts was undisputed and the form of the trusts satisfied local law, the
court sustained the Commissioner's contention that the trusts must be
consolidated for trust purposes. The court stated that the intent test
is limited to multiple trusts with different beneficiaries.2 7 It noted that
courts have often struck down tax avoidance schemes by extension of
the "business purpose doctrine," made to realign transactions under-
taken with the intent to avoid taxes. Rather than expressly apply the
business purpose (or in this case, trust purpose) doctrine to multiple
trusts, however, the court purported to follow a different test-the "sub-
122. E.g., Hale v. Dominion Nat'l Bank, 186 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1951); E. B. Hiecke
Trust, 6 T.C. 30 (1946). See also Soter, supra, note 104 at 356-60; Note, supra note 96,
at 311; Note, supra note 112, at 161-62.
123. E.g., Commissioner v. Mellvaine, 78 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1935).
124. McHarg v. Fitzpatrick, 210 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1954).
125. See Note, supra note 112, at 162.
126. 190 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 296 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1961),
46 MINN. L. RlEv. 1111 (1962).
127. 190 F. Supp. at 952.
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stance-form" test, or what has also been called the "sham doctrine."128
In applying this test, the court said that close scrutiny is to be given to
all family transactions, such as multiple trusts set up by a father for his
son, and that where the "entire scheme is but a mockery of our tax
laws ... [where] it is obvious on the facts that we are confronted with
shams, not realities, shadows and not substance,"1' then "substance
must and does prevail over form,"130 and the trusts will be consoli-
dated and taxed accordingly.
Since the Boyce case, no other reported decision has applied the
"sham doctrine" to multiple trusts, leaving the status of the multiple
accumulation trust with a single beneficiary more uncertain than ever.
In fact, there has been very little litigation involving this device in re-
cent years, which could be due either to the taxpayers' wariness of
this device or to the Commissioner's willingness to wait for Congress
to act upon the pending multiple trust legislation before using judicial
rules such as the sham doctrine to attack this device.
2. Present Advantages and Uses. - The income tax advantages of
multiple trusts-accumulation of income in low-bracket entities and
tax-free distribution of the accumulated income-have already been
illustrated. There are, however, many situations in which multiple
trusts are used to achieve non-tax purposes.131 Often, for example, a
grantor may want to select different trustees for different types of
property. Or, if his properties are far apart, he may need separate
trusts in order to provide better management of his land. Also, he may
have a different reason for establishing each trust; i.e., one for a child's
education, one for his maintenance, one for insurance, and so on, with
a different trustee for each purpose. Generally, if each trust has the
same beneficiary, but a different remainderman, the multiple trusts
are formed for a non-tax purpose. They may, however, be formed to
serve limited business purposes; for example, to facilitate a leasing ar-
rangement, to obtain loans, or to foreclose mortgages. 32 These possible
alternatives might help refute a Government argument that the
multiple trust device was formed only to avoid taxes. It is difficult,
however, to imagine a situation in which multiple trusts for the
same beneficiary, each with the same trustee, and each encompassing
interests in substantially the same property, could serve a legitimate
non-tax purpose.
128. Id. at 956.
129. Id. at 957.
130. Id. at 958.
131. Indeed, multiple trusts were used long before the federal income tax was passed.
E.g., Thelluson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (1805). See HAnms,
F.mm ESTATE PLANNiNr, GUImE 290, 291 (1957).
132. See Ervin, supra note 100, at 412-18.
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We have already seen how multiple trusts were used by the Alger
family to accumulate income at a considerable tax saving. To assure
the maximum tax benefit, however, the Algers must still provide for
distribution of the accumulated income so as to avoid the five-year
throwback rule.13 One possibility is for Horace, Sr. to set up a
master trust as a partner, and seven subsidiary trusts for each of his
eight grandchildren. In the first year, the master trust would dis-
tribute all of its income equally to the first of each grandchild's
seven trusts; in the second year it would distribute to the second of
each grandchild's seven trusts; ultimately, in the seventh year, the
first trust of each grandchild would distribute to him its accumulated
earnings over the past seven years, and assuming an undistributed
net income of less than 2000 dollars, this distribution would be tax-
free.134 The next year, the cycle would begin anew. Another less
complicated plan could be utilized in the trust arrangement originally
described-that is, thriee trusts for each grandchild-with tax free
distribution as each grandchild attains the age of twenty-one. 35
Outside of the family partnership, the multiple trust device is most
advantageous when used pursuant to a transfer of high-yield property
to a single donee. Thus, an elderly man, such as our friend Horace,
Sr., who is interested in making inter vivos transfers of a large bloc
of high yield securities-in order to reduce his own income taxes,"'
to reduce his gross estate137 and to take advantage of annual gift
tax exemptions"38 - might transfer his stock in separate trusts for the
same beneficiary at the end of every year. Each trust could accu-
mulate income for nine years and distribute tax free in the tenth
year. 39 Finally, as writers in this field have often suggested, the
logical end of the multiple trust arrangement would be to transfer
property to enough trusts so that no one trust would have more
than 100 dollars in annual income. In this way, no trust would be
taxable, because of the 100 dollar income tax exemption. 40 Further-
more, annual distributions would also be tax free, 141 resulting in
complete tax avoidance. Of course, one difficulty with such a plan
is that the expense of trustees' fees alone would probably far exceed
the highest tax rate on the total income.
133. Supra note 111. The specific statutory exceptions to the throwback rule provide
clear guides for avoiding the rule. See notes 114-18 supra.
134. Supra note 111.
135. Supra note 114.
136. LNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-77.
137. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2036, 2038.
138. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b).
139. Supra note 117.
140. Supra note 95.
141. Supra note 118.
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As an income splitting device, the future of the multiple accumula-
tion trust arrangement is tenuous at best. Even if Congress fails to
pass regulatory legislation, it seems likely that the courts, by extending
the sham or business purpose doctrines, will take an initiative in
limiting this device. 142 Under the present statutory law, however, the
taxpayer can take certain precautions which may support his multiple
trust arrangement under even the closest scrutiny of the judiciary.
143
To illustrate, let us assume that Horace, Sr. adopts a plan by which
three separate trusts of equal property interests are created for each
of his eight grandchildren, with distribution of accumulated income
and corpus as each attains majority. In order to maintain the separate
identity of each of the twenty-four trusts, Horace, Sr. should begin
by executing a special instrument for each trust. The three trusts for
each grandchild should be as different from each other as feasible.
This means that there should be different non-tax purposes set out
in each trust instrument, different provisions, different combinations
of remaindermen; and probably a different trustee for each.144 As to
management of the trusts, each should have a separate bank account,
a separate set of records, and separate income tax returns. In spite of
the obvious expense that such a plan would involve, if the partnership
income is high, it could create a sufficient tax saving to make the
plan worthwhile.
3. Proposed Legislation.-A report was submitted in 1956 to the
House Ways and Means Committee by the Advisory Group on
Subchapter J, headed by Professor Casner, recommending, among
other things, legislation to restrict the use of multiple accumulation
trusts for a single beneficiary. 45 The Advisory Group proposed an
amendment to the Code146 which would provide that multiple
142. E.g., Boyce v. United States, supra note 126. See Somers, First Case on Mul-
tiple Trusts Suggests That Code Revision May Not Be Needed, 14 J. TAXAnTON 363
(1961). It is mere speculation whether any of these arrangements would stand up
under a liberal application of either of these doctrines.
143. See Ervin, supra note 100, at 404; Soter, supra note 104, at 362.
144. No real reason appears, however, why three trustees should not manage all 24
trusts between them.
145. Subsequent reports were submitted in later years. See Hearings on Advisory
Group Recommendations on Subchapter C, J, and K of Internal Revenue Code Before
the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
247, 249, 263-71 (1959).
146. Section 641 provides:
641(c) Multiple Trusts
(1) If a grantor establishes at any time or times separate intervivos trusts,
to the extent that during any year or portions of a year the primary
beneficiary or beneficiaries of the currently accumulated income or
taxable income allocated to corpus of the separate trusts are sub-
stantially the same, the total tax payable...
(A) shall be computed as though the separate trusts were one trust, ...
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trusts created for substantially the same primary beneficiary are to
be consolidated and taxed as one trust. This solution has been called
the "consolidation approach." 47 It would restrict the principal tax
avoidance aspect of the multiple trust device-the accumulation of
income in low-bracket entities. Three exceptions listed are: (1)
where income of the combined trusts does not exceed 2000 dollars;
(2) where there are no more than three trusts, created at five-year
or longer intervals; and (3) where the tax produced by consolidation
is greater than the total tax on the separate trusts. 148 The second
of these recognizes that non-tax purposes occasionally motivate the
formation of multiple trusts.
Despite the Advisory Group's proposals, the House Ways and
Means Committee in 1960 suggested a different approach to solve
the multiple trust problem.149 It proposed stiffer limitations upon the
second tax avoidance aspect of multiple trusts-that is, the tax-free
distribution of accumulated income. The new Code section 669150
was recommended, under which accumulated income of multiple
trusts (two or more trusts with a common beneficiary set up by the
same grantor), when distributed to the same beneficiary as a "section
669 distribution,"'5 ' would be subject to a new ten-year throwback
rule. This throwback rule would not qualify for the various exceptions
by which taxpayers can avoid the old five-year throwback rule. The
proposal was incorporated into H.R. 9662,52 a lengthy tax revision bill
which was reported out of the Ways and Means Committee and
passed by the House on January 28, 1960.
Later in 1960, H.R. 9662 reached the Senate Finance Committee.
There, the ten-year throwback rule was abandoned, and the Advisory
Groups' consolidation approach was adopted. It was made even more
stringent, however, by restricting the number of permissible trusts
to two, and requiring that they be created at least eight years apart. 5 '
The bill failed to reach the Senate floor in 1960, and was twice passed
over after it subsequently reached the Senate calendar.
except
(i) when such income or such taxable income or both are less than $2,000,
or
(ii) when the separate trusts do not exceed three in number and no two
of them were created within a period of sixty months . . . . Methods
of assessment and allocation of this to be made under regulations of the
Secretary of the Treasury. Id. at 263.
147. See Filiman & Barnet, supra note 107, at 38; Gordon, Multiple Trusts: The Con-
solidation Approach, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 25 (1957).
148. See note 146 supra.
149. H.R. REP No. 1231, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1960).
150. Id. at 121.
151. Id. at 122.
152. Id. at 101-71.
153. H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(c) (i)(A)(ii) (1960).
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It has been suggested that the controversy over the multiple trust
provision was the main reason that H.R. 9662 was not passed in
1960.' 5 The New York Bar in 1959 opposed the Advisory Group's
solution, mainly on the ground that the important determination of
beneficiaries who are "substantially the same," would be extremely
difficult.' - After the House took a different approach to solving the
multiple trust problem, the American Bar Association recommended
that the portions of H.R. 9662 relating to multiple trusts not be
enacted until parties affected had become more familiar with the
new provisions. This position was based on the ground that these
changes would have a material and disruptive effect upon tax
planning. 56 The Advisory Group, however, recommended that its
proposals be given immediate effect, since it was publicly announced
in 1956 that legislation dealing with multiple trusts would be sub-
mitted to Congress. 57 At the present time, the Treasury Department,
for unexplained reasons, has ceased to urge legislative reform in the
field of multiple trusts.
D. Multiple Corporations
Use of the corporate form of doing business presents yet another
device to split income, that of multiple incorporation. As stated
earlier, a consideration of the many factors to be considered in
choosing the business form is outside the scope of this note. 58 How-
ever, focusing again on the enterprising Horace Alger, Sr., we might
look briefly at a few reasons why he might decide to incorporate his
business, which is now being operated as a family partnership.
Disregarding the many tax advantages unique to corporations, there
are two factors which alone might persuade Horace, Sr. to incor-
porate. First, incorporation will prevent personal income tax liability
on undistributed net earnings plowed back into the business for
expansion purposes. 59 Second, the corporate form is an excellent
device by which the business can be perpetuated and kept under
competent, family management. This goal can be accomplished by a
transfer of voting stock to Horace, Jr., either directly or in trust,
with Horace, Sr. as trustee, and either the distribution of non-voting
stock or long-term bonds to other members of the family.
154. See Somers, supra note 142, at 363.
155. Hearings, supra note 145, at 1009-11.
156. A.B.A., SECION ON TAXATON 148, 149 (1960).
157. Hearings, supra note 145, at 271.
158. See Strecker, When will the Corporate Form Save Taxes? 18 VAND. L. REv. 1695
(1965). See also Caplin, Partnership or S Corporation? A Check List of the Tax
Factors in the Choice, 12 1. TAXATION 32 (1960).
159. Partnership earnings are taxed to the partners whether distributed or not.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 702(c).
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In order to illustrate how multiple incorporation saves taxes, let
us now assume that Horace, Sr. was finally persuaded to incorporate
and transfer the voting shares to himself and Horace, Jr. in exchange
for cash, and the non-voting shares to the trustee for the grandchil-
dren's trusts in exchange for the plant and equipment.160 We will
assume further that the year after incorporation, the corporation's
taxable income, after deduction of salary, depreciation, and interest
expense, was 300,000 dollars, all of which Horace, Sr. and Horace, Jr.
decided to use to purchase new equipment for the business. The
tax on this amount, at 1966 corporate tax rates,161 would be 5500
dollars (twenty-two per cent) on the first 25,000 dollars of income
and 132,000 dollars (twenty-two per cent plus twenty-six per cent
surtax) on the balance, for a total of 137,500 tax dollars. This
amount represents no tax saving when compared with the taxes
payable when the business was operated as a partnership. 62 There-
fore, Horace, Sr. will be interested in lowering taxes further, in
order to release a greater amount of the corporate income for expan-
sion and improvement in his highly competitive field of business.
One way to accomplish such a tax saving may be multiple incorpo-
ration.
The following discussion of multiple corporations will proceed in
an order slightly different from the discussions of the other two
income splitting devices. To make the discussion of legislative and
judicial limits on multiple incorporation more meaningful, its various
tax and non-tax advantages will be discussed first; its limits second;
and last, a recent proposal for legislative reform.
1. Advantages of Multiple Incorporation.-From an income splitting
point of view, the chief advantage of multiple incorporation lies in
the 25,000 dollar surtax exemption granted to every corporation.163 As
we saw in the example above, the first 25,000 dollars of taxable
corporate income is subject to the relatively low tax rate of twenty-
two per cent, or 5500 dollars, while all taxable income in excess of
25,000 dollars is taxed at a rate of forty-eight per cent.1' Thus, it
would appear that for each new corporation the Algers can form and
to which at least 25,000 dollars of business income can be attributed,
160. No gain will be recognized on this transaction. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 351.
161. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11(b)-(d).
162. See notes 46-48 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that the
figures for taxation of the family partnership were based upon $300,000 net income
including the partners' compensation, while the corporate tax figures are based upon
$300,000 excluding salaries deducted.
163. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11(d).
164. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 11(b),(c).
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there will be a tax saving of 6500 dollars, an amount equal to the
surtax (twenty-six per cent) on 25,000 dollars. Thus, the Algers
could incorporate their business and form ten subsidiary corporations,
each to manage sales in a separate section of the country, leaving
the manufacturing to the parent corporation. Theoretically, this
scheme could save 65,000 dollars in income taxes annually because
of the ten additional surtax exemptions. However, a tax saving would
not necessarily result, as we shall see in the next part.16 It is, in
fact, extremely difficult to discuss the practical uses of multiple
incorporation as an income splitting device without examining in
some detail the restrictions that both Congress and the courts have
placed upon this device. Before discussing these limitations, how-
ever, we should look briefly at some of the other advantages offered
by multiple corporations.
The second main tax advantage of multiple corporations involves
the possibility of multiplying the 100,000 dollar accumulated earn-
ings credit.166 Section 531 of the Code167 prevents corporations from
being used to shield high earnings from high-bracket personal income
tax by imposing an almost confiscatory accumulated earnings tax on
earnings accumulated by corporations for reasons other than "rea-
sonable business needs." Section 535(c),168 however, allows every
corporation a lifetime accumulation of 100,000 dollars, which is
exempt from the accumulated earnings tax regardless of the reason for
the accumulation.
It is obvious that when the Alger enterprise ceases to expand, if
there is only a single, high-income corporation, then earnings will
soon have to be distributed to shareholders in order to avoid the
accumulated earnings tax, thus subjecting the business income to
"double taxation."169 As stated earlier, the Subchapter S election is
one way to avoid such a double tax. 70 This option is not open to
the Alger corporation, however, for two reasons: it has issued two
165. In addition to the various Code sections (notes 180, 185, 195 infra) and
judicial doctrines (note 203 infra) which may disallow the entire $65,000 savings,
1964 legislation applies an additional 6% tax to members of certain controlled corpo-
rate groups as a price for multiple surtax exemptions, which results in a tax saving of
$3,500 for the second corporation in a controlled group, and $5,000 for each additional
member thereafter (note 211 infra).
166. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 535(c).
167. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 531.
168. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 535(c).
169. See GOoDE, THE CoRoRaT INcom TAx (1950).
170. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 1371-77. For a discussion of subehapter S, see
Stein, Optional Taxation of Closely Held Corporations Under the Technical Amend-
ment Act of 1958, 72 HAv. L. REv. 710 (1959). See also Caplin, supra note 158.
To curb the use of subehapter S as a way around the family partnership rules of §
704(c), § 1375(c) provides for allocation of dividends among family members if neces-
sary to reflect services rendered by them.
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classes of stock;71 and part of the stock is held by a trustee.172 Accu-
mulation of earnings in the corporation might result in a greater tax
saving than a Subchapter S election anyway, since the latter often
entails very high personal income tax rates, while the former are
taxed at no more than the maximum corporate rate of forty-eight per
cent.' 73 Furthermore since accumulations will enhance the value of
the corporate stock, it is even possible that, in the event the stock
passes through an estate,'7 4 there will be no double income tax on
the accumulations, though of course the enhanced value of the
stock will increase the estate tax. Also, earnings on the accumulated
income are taxable at corporate rates instead of potentially higher
personal income rates.175 Thus, at least theoretically, if the Alger
corporation forms ten subsidiaries, an additional 1,000,000 dollars
can be accumulated and retained in the family business. 176
There are a few other minor tax advantages that result from
multiple incorporation, 177 and some non-tax advantages which should
be discussed in order to ascertain whether the use of multiple corpo-
rations must necessarily stem from tax avoidance motives. 178 P1rin-
cipally, these are: (1) to protect the business assets by diffusing
tort and contract liability among separate corporate entities; (2)
to separate various aspects of the business into autonomous, adminis-
tratively convenient divisions; (3) to separate the enterprise into
geographical divisions, in order to build up local or sectional identi-
fication with the various names of the subsidiaries; (4) to permit
executives of each subsidiary to acquire proprietary interest in their
own division of the business; and (5) to promote outside investment
by facilitating investment in limited portions of the business.
2. Limitations Imposed.-Having looked at the tax advantages
offered by splitting business income among several corporations, we
can now discuss the many intricate and overlapping rules promulgated
by both the courts and Congress to restrict multiple incorporation
from being used solely to obtain these advantages.
(a). The Pre-1964 Era.-(1). Legislative Limits. Before passage
171. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(a).
172. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371(2).
173. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 11(b)-(j).
174. INr. BEV. CODE OF 1954, § 1014.
175. But see personal holding company tax sections, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
541-47.
176. For the various ways in which these accumulated earnings credits may bo
wholly disallowed, see notes 180, 185, 195, 203 infra.
177. Increased qualified investment tax credits, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 38; possi-
ble elimination of estimated corporate income tax under, § 6016; easier withdrawal
of accumulations at capital gain rates pursuant to liquidation, § 331. See also, Note,
18 VAND. L. REv. 1338, 1341-43 (1965).
178. Note, supra note 177.
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of the amendments in the 1964 Code dealing with "controlled corp-
orate groups,"' 9 only one Code section, 1551,180 had been passed
specifically to restrict tax avoidance via multiple corporations. This
section, whose predecessor first appeared in 1951,181 disallows the two
principal tax advantages of multiple incorporation to transferee corpo-
rations receiving property, other than money, from a transferor,
where "a major purpose"' 82 of the transfer was to obtain either of
these two tax benefits. Before 1964, it applied only to intercorporate
transfers of the parent-subsidiary type.tm The taxpayer had to dem-
onstrate that non-tax, business purposes were the substantial, moti-
vating factors behind the transfer.'8
Two other Code sections have also been used by the Commissioner
to disallow tax benefits derived from multiple incorporation, although
neither was passed with multiple corporations specifically in mind.
In 1944, the predecessor of what is now section 2 69 18 was passed,
primarily to prevent the acquisitions of loss corporations for the
purpose of using the loss carryover of an acquired "loss corporation"
to offset future income of the acquiring corporation.tm Like section
1551, the sine qua non for application of this section lies in the
purpose or intent of the taxpayer. Section 269 provides that where
an individual or corporation acquires control of a corporation and
the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or
avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction,
credit, or other allowance which such person or corporation would not
otherwise enjoy, then the Secretary or his delegate may disallow such
deduction, credit, or other allowance. 187
It should be noted that the sanctions imposed by section 269188
are broader than those imposed by section 1551, but the application
of these sanctions is narrower in that the Commissioner must show
that tax avoidance was "the principal purpose."189 Despite this heavier
179. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1561-63.
180. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1551.
181. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 15(c), 65 Stat. 468. See Strecker, Multiple
Corporations, 2 CoR". P c. COmn ErNTATOR, Aug. 1960, p.l.
182. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1551(a).
183. See, e.g., Airlene Gas Co. v. United States, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. ir 9805 (D. Ky.
1958). But see 1964 amendment, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1551(a) (3).
184. See, e.g., Camelot Realty Co. v. United States, 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9132
(W.D. Pa. 1959); Sno-Frost, Inc., 31 T.C. 1058 (1959).
185. Revenue Act of 1944, ch. 63, § 129, 58 Stat. 47. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 269.
186. S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 58-60 (1943).
187, INr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 269. See Rice, Internal Revenue Code, Section 269:
Does the Left Hand Know What the Right Is Doing?, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 579 (1955).
188. Ibid.
189. Ibid.
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burden of proof, section 269 has been an important weapon in the
Commissioner's arsenal. One reason for this is that until the 1964
amendments, section 1551 applied only to parent-subsidiary corpora-
tions,190 leaving section 269 as the main weapon against the brother-
sister type of multiple incorporation.
Originally, application of section 269 was further restricted by two
case law doctrines. The first, called the "Alprosa Watch doctrine,"191
was that the sanctions of section 269 apply only to acquiring corpora-
tions, and not to the acquired corporation. This doctrine, however,
has generally been refuted by recent cases.192 A second argument
occasionally made by taxpayers was that section 269 does not apply
to the formation of new corporations, as does section 1551, but only
to the acquisition of an existing corporation. 93 This view too has
been refuted.
194
The third pre-1964 weapon used by the Commissioner against
multiple incorporation is section 482.195 This section gives the Com-
missioner authority to allocate "income, deductions, credits, or allow-
ances" among related businesses "if necessary to prevent evasion of
taxes or clearly reflect the income of such . . . businesses."196 The
predecessor of section 482 was passed in 1921 to enable the Com-
missioner to require consolidated returns for income or profits arbi-
trarily shifted to avoid taxes among businesses owned by common
interests. 19
7
Section 482 has traditionally been applied to reallocate income
among corporations only in rather extreme cases, involving fraudulent
transactions of improper bookkeeping among commonly controlled
corporations. 9 However in a recent case, Hamburgers York Road,
Inc.,199 the Tax Court upheld an allocation by the Commissioner of
all the net income of a new suburban clothing store to its brother
corporation, a long-established clothing store nearby, owned by the
same shareholders. There was no doubt that the suburban store had
190. See note 183 supra and accompanying text.
191. Alprosa Watch Co., 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
192. E.g., Commissioner v. British Motor Car Distrib., Ltd., 278 F.2d 392 (9th Cir.
1960); Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1959).
193. E.g., J. E. Dilworth Co. v. Henslee, 98 F. Supp. 957, (M.D. Tenn. 1951).
194. Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957); James
Realty Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 306 (D. Minn. 1959). See Strecker, supra
note 181, at 20-27.
195. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 482.
196. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 482.
197. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 240(d), 42 Stat. 260.
198. See Commissioner v. Chelsea Prod., Inc., 197 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952). See also
Cooper, Section 45, 4 TAx L. REv. 131, 166 (1948); Pomeroy, Allocation of Income,
Deductions, Credits, and Allowances Among Related Taxpayers, 15 W. REs. L. REV.
250 (1964).
199. 41 T.C. 821 (1964).
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actually earned the income attributed to it. The court, however,
sustained the consolidation of income under section 482, apparently
on two grounds: that not all dealings between the two corporations
were strictly at "arm's length"; 0 and that the suburban store was
incorporated principally to obtain tax benefits.201 As a consequence
of this recent extension of section 482, the future of multiple corpora-
tions, even if they serve valid, business purposes, is extremely uncer-
tain.
(2). Court-Made Limitations.-Courts have often been disturbed
over intentional tax avoidance accomplished by various income
splitting devices, particularly in intra-family transactions. To restrict
these practices, the courts have developed devices variously deemed
the "sham" or "business purpose" or "assignment of income" doctrines,
and apply them today with a vigor matched only by the vagueness
of the principles upon which these doctrines rest. These "common
law" weapons against income splitting devices will be discussed more
fully in Part 111.202
A good example of a court-made rule being used by the Commis-
sioner is found in the Tax Court case of Aldon Homes, Inc.203 This
case involved a realty development project in which the brother
corporation, Aldon Homes, transferred real estate to fifteen sister
alphabet corporations, owned by the same investors who owned
Aldon Homes. The Commissioner contended that these fifteen corpo-
rations should be disregarded as shams, since they "were not formed
for any business purpose, did not function in income producing
capacities, and lacked substance and reality."204 In sustaining the
Commissioner's contention, the court began with the proposition "that
taxpayers have the right to mold business transactions in such a way
as to minimize the incidence of taxation,"2°5 and it cited cases to this
effect. It continued:
The above cases make it clear that a taxpayer may adopt any form he desires
for the conduct of his business and that form cannot be ignored merely
because it results in a tax saving. However, to be afforded recognition, the
form the taxpayer chooses must be a viable business entity, that is, it must
have been formed for a substantial business purpose or actually engage in
substantive business activity.2
06
200. Id. at 835-37.
201. Id. at 838.
202. See notes 231-33 infra and accompanying text. See also, Strecker, supra note
181, at 29-32.
203. 33 T.C. 582 (1959).
204. Id. at 595.
205. Id. at 596.
206. Id. at 596-97.
1966] NOTES 1319
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Thus, by relying solely upon the court-made "sham" doctrine, the
Commissioner was able to disallow a potential 375,000 dollars in surtax
exemptions and 1,500,000 dollars in accumulated earnings credits.0 7
(b). The 1964 Amendments.-As is demonstrated above, the statu-
tory and judicial limitations imposed upon multiple corporations are
couched in vague terms, often involving determination of the tax-
payer's subjective intent, or the "reality" or "substance" of the
transaction in question. Thus, they have been fertile ground for
opaque, confusing and contradictory judicial decisions, leaving the
tax status of multiple corporations in considerable doubt.
Several amendments to the 1964 Code affect the status of multiple
corporations. °8 Unfortunately, rather than clearing the air by giving
objective guidelines the 1964 amendments merely present a series
of incredibly complex rules designed to prevent members of controlled
corporate groups from acquiring increased benefits from multiple
surtax exemptions caused by the reduction of the ordinary corporate
tax (on the first 25,000 dollars) from thirty per cent to twenty-two
per cent.2 9 This new legislation neither eliminates the tax advan-
tages of multiple incorporation nor does it supersede the various
statutory and court-made limitations upon multiple corporations dis-
cussed above.
The most important changes in the tax treatment of multiple corpo-
rations made by the 1964 Revenue Act were summarized in a recent
article :210
These changes are: (1) the limitation of controlled corporate groups to a
single surtax exemption unless an election is made to claim a surtax exemp-
tion for each member of the group, and each member pays an additional
tax of 6 per cent on its first 25,000 dollars of income,211 (2) the amend-
ment of code section 1551 extending its application to transfers to brother-
sister corporations, 212 (3) repeal of the 2 per cent tax on consolidated
returns,213 and (4) the amendment of code sections 243 to allow corporations
to deduct 100 per cent of the dividends received from affiliated corpora-
tions.2 14
207. See Shaw Constr. Co., 35 T.C. 1102 (1961) for a similar case. The Tax Court
has indicated that it will not construe these cases as authority for disregarding the
corporate entity, merely because its formation was tax motivated. Armais Arutunoff,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 931 (1963).
208. See statutes cited, notes 210-13 infra. On the 1964 legislation, see Colquhoun,
Multiple Corporations, 15 W. RFs. L. Rrv. 242, 247-50 (1964); Hamovitt & Schlesinger,
New Treatment of Multiple Corporations, 16 W. RBs. L. REv. 317 (1965); Note, 18
VAND. L. REv. 1338 (1965).
209. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 117-18 (1963).
210. Note, supra note 177, at 1351.
211. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1561-63.
212. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1551(a) (3).
213. Revenue Act of 1964, § 234, 78 Stat. 113.
214. INT. RiEv. CODE OF 1954, § 243(a)(3).
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These legislative changes not only reduce the value of additional
surtax exemptions for the "controlled group of corporations," 215 they
also encourage the use of consolidated returns for affiliated parent-
subsidiary corporations by repealing the two per cent tax on con-
solidated income 216 and allowing a deduction of 100 per cent of
dividends received from affiliated domestic corporations217 Together
with the broad judicial interpretations of sections 1551, 269, and
482, these amendments definitely tend to discourage multiple incorpo-
ration. Nevertheless, for the courageous taxpayers who successfully
cross this legislative and judicial minefield, multiple incorporation
continues to be an important tax-avoidance device.
3. A Legislative Proposal.-In 1958 Professor Stanley S. Surrey,
working on the American Law Institute Tax Project,218 presented some
fresh views on how Congress should treat the problem of tax avoid-
ance via multiple incorporation. Professor Surrey recognized that
"explicit statutory protection against multiple corporation distortion
has been based almost entirely on a tax-avoidance standard."21' 9 He
questioned whether tax avoidance is even relevant in answering the
question of when tax benefits accruing because of multiple incorpora-
tion should be disallowed.
The method pursued by Professor Surrey in answering this question
begins with a determination of the policies which motivated Congress
to pass the two main tax benefits utilized by multiple corporations to
avoid taxes-that is, the surtax exemption and the minimum accu-
mulated earnings credit. He gives the obvious answer: These
provisions were designed to provide financial aid to "small busi-
nesses." 220 Thus, the determinative question should not be whether
215. A "controlled group" is defined as (1) parent-subsidiary corporations with 80%
of ownership and control of the subsidiary corporations in the hands of one or more
of the member corporations, and at least 80% ownership and control of at least one
subsidiary corporation in the hands of the parent corporation; and (2) brother-sister
corporations in which at least 80% ownership or control is in the hands of a single
individual, trust or estate, with far-reaching constructive ownership rules applicable.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1563(a).
216. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1551(a)(3).
217. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1503.
218. This project was pursued jointly by the ALI and ABA from 1956-1958. See
REPORT OF WORKING VIEvS OF A STuDy BY THE AmERiCAN LAw INSTITUTE STAFF
AN Am~raucAN BAR AsSOCIATION LIAsoN COmmxrTEE, ALl FEDRAL INCOME, ESTATE
AND Gir TAx PROJEcT, INCOmE TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS, 367 (1958). For a good summary of this report, see Surrey, Income Tax
Problems of Corporations and Shareholders: American Law Institute Tax Project-
American Bar Association Committee Study on Legislative Revision, 14 TAx L. REv.
1, 37 (1958).
219. Surrey, supra note 218, at 38.
220. H.R. REP. No. 2198, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1957); H.R. REP. No. 1662,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 71-2 (1954) (accumulated earnings credit); H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1951)(surtax
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there was a tax-avoidance purpose, but whether multiple corporations
controlled by the same individual or group should each be considered
"small business," entitled to the above tax benefits. As Professor
Surrey points out, "although each separate corporation may be small,
the whole operation is not."' 1
Professor Surrey follows his method to its logical conclusion. Since
it is obvious that multiple corporations under common control were
not the intended recipients of small business tax benefits, then cor-
rective legislation should be principally concerned with restricting
these benefits to small businesses. To accomplish this, Professor
Surrey would treat parent-subsidiary and brother-sister corporations
as a unit for purposes of the surtax exemption and accumulated
earnings credit, but only where there is the requisite common control.
In defining the degree of control necessary for disallowing these tax
benefits, he would rely upon the eighty per cent stock ownership
for the parent-subsidiary corporate group; and for brother-sister
corporations, he would require that eighty per cent of the stock
of each corporation be owned by no more than the same five individ-
uals, and that the business activities of the corporations be con-
ducted in an integrated manner.22
Although Professor Surrey's proposals were included in the Presi-
dent's 1963 Tax Message to Congress,2 23 they were not included in the
1964 amendments to the Code. Consequently, taxpayers today con-
tinue to avoid taxes by splitting and accumulating business income
among multiple, related corporate entities.
III. EVALUATION OF LMTrrs IMPOSED UPON INCOME SPLITTINc DEVICES
A. Three Approaches to the Problem
All of the income splitting devices discussed in this note utilize the
same general method to avoid taxes: the fragmentation of income,
potentially taxable to a single taxpayer, among numerous, related
tax entities. As we have seen, this method often produces a far greater
tax saving than the more familiar method of converting ordinary
income into capital gains.
The important question remains: When should the related, taxable
entities formed pursuant to the income splitting devices described
exemption). See Surrey, supra note 218, at 38. See also Sharp, Multiple Tax Bcncfits
Through Multiple Incorporation: Some Thoughts on the Law As It Is and As It
Ought to Be, 40 B.U.L. REv. 375 (1960).
221. Surrey, supra note 218, at 40.
222. Id. at 42. Compare the definition of a "controlled group of corporations" in
the 1964 amendments, supra note 215.
223. Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Tax Recom-
mendations of the President, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 14 (1963).
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in Part II be recognized for tax purposes? Put another way: When
should the tax benefits resulting from income splitting be disallowed?
There are three general approaches that Congress and the courts
have taken at various times in answering this question. In evaluating
the relative merits and defects of each, two main criteria will be used.
First, applying the empirical method, we will determine how effective
each approach has been when applied in the past in terms of the ease
with which it has been applied, the certainty of the resulting rules,
and the consistency of the results reached by these rules. Second,
using the a priori method, we will examine the logic behind each
method to determine to what extent each is capable of producing
rational, equitable solutions to the problem of tax avoidance via
income splitting.
1. Motive or Intent of the Taxpayer.-The first of the three ap-
proaches is based upon the subjective motive or intent of the tax-
payer. The rule under this approach is: Whenever the income
splitting device in question was utilized with the principal motive
of avoiding taxes, then the resulting tax benefits should be disallowed.
Congress has often passed statutes indicating that the taxpayer's
intent is critical in determining the tax consequences of particular
transactions. 224 We have examined two such statutes in Part II-
sections 155122 and 269.22 Even in section 704(e) ,227 which was
designed to provide objective guidelines for tax consequences of
family partnerships, the regulations make the taxpayer's intent one of
the factors to consider in determining whether there was a complete
transfer of capital to the donee-partner. 228 This approach is often
stated in terms of what the taxpayer intended, though in actual fact
"motive" would be a more accurate term, since courts applying this
approach are interested ultimately in the principal reasons that im-
pelled the taxpayer's acts (motive) rather than the objects to be
attained by his acts (the usual definition of intent). This is admittedly
a narrow distinction, but in view of the ambiguity of the term "intent,"
it is an important one in understanding the first approach to the
tax avoidance problem of income splitting.m
The courts have also occasionally made the motive of the taxpayer
224. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 306(b) (4) (preferred stock bailout);
§ 367 (reorganization involving foreign corporation); § 355(a)(1)(D)(ii) (spin-off
reorganization).
225. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1551.
226. Revenue Act of 1944, ch. 13, § 129, 58 Stat. 47. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 269.
227. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 501, § 340, 65 Stat. 511.
228. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(3)(i)(b)(1956).
229. See PAUL, Motive and Intent in Federal Tax Law, in SELECTED STUDIEs IN
FEDERAL TAXATION 255 (1938).
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the critical factor in determining tax consequences, even when the
relevant statute does not mention motive. As has been demonstrated
by several recent cases discussed in Part II, the courts today go to
great lengths to deny tax benefits to transactions "tinged with tax-
avoiding motives."230 Nevertheless, these same courts continue to pay
homage to the old rule that the taxpayer's motive, even of tax
avoidance, is irrelevant in determining tax consequences. The most
notable example of this type of court decision is the long line of
cases purporting to follow what has been deemed the "business pur-
pose doctrine." After reciting carefully that the taxpayer's motive is
irrelevant, the Supreme Court in Gregory v. Helveringe' held that
when a corporate reorganization serves no business purpose other
than as a tax avoidance device, even though the Code requirements
are carefully followed, the tax benefits are to be disallowed. The
court stated that "[tihe rule which excludes from consideration the
motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, because
the transaction on its face lies outside the plain intent of the statute."2 32
Thus, it appears that the business purpose test, as it was first
formulated, purported to look to the business purposes and functions
served by the transaction in question and not to the taxpayer's
subjective motive for engaging in the transaction. This method
closely conforms to the second general approach, or to what has
been called the "sham doctrine," to be discussed below. However,
subsequent applications of the business purpose doctrine have often
placed great emphasis upon the taxpayer's motive in determining
whether his transaction served a business (non-tax) purpose.233 Ap-
parently many courts have interpreted the "purpose" of the business
purpose doctrine to mean the taxpayer's motive in engaging in the
transaction, instead of the business function served by the transaction.
Another example illustrating that the taxpayer's motive is determi-
native of the tax consequences of an income splitting device is to
be found in the Culbertson case. There it was held that tax recogni-
tion of partners in a family partnership formed by gifts of capital
depends upon whether the partnership was formed "in good faith...
for a business purpose."m This test was superseded in 1951 by what
230. Id. at 290.
231. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
232. Id. at 470.
233. Judge Learned Hand stated that Gregory v. Helvering "has sometimes been
understood to contradict the doctrine that the motive to avoid taxation is never, as such,
relevant. In fact it does not trench upon that doctrine; it merely declares that to be a
separate, jural person for purposes of taxation, a corporation must engage in some
industrial, commercial, or other activity besides avoiding taxation." National Investors
Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir. 1944).
234. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 742 (1949).
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is now section 704(e).235
Evaluation.-Turning first to the usefulness of this approach in
terms of the results it has heretofore produced when applied, we
have seen a notable instance of the confusion and uncertainty it can
cause in the line of cases following Culbertson, where the taxpayer's
motive was the critical factor in determining whether or not to
recognize a family partnership for tax purposes. Similarly, there has
been neither consistency nor certainty in the application of sections
1551 and 691, which disallow certain tax benefits accruing to multi-
ple corporations according to the degree of the taxpayer's tax avoid-
ance motive. Finally, the height of confusion has resulted when
courts have construed the sham or business purpose doctrine so as
to superimpose a requirement of non-tax, business motives in order
that tax recognition be accorded to any transaction.
Another element to consider is the ease with which this approach
can be avoided. One familiar justification for the use of motive in
determining tax consequences is that objective standards for tax bene-
fits can easily be avoided, and that the requirement of a non-tax motive
prevents such distortion of tax statutes z 6 This reasoning is, however,
often shown to be fallacious. For example, in Part II we saw various
ways in which taxpayers can use multiple trusts and multiple corpo-
rations principally to avoid taxes while appearing to use these devices
for legitimate, non-tax purposes.
It is, however, in the second phase of our evaluation-the logic
behind this approach-that it proves to be most defective. It is
submitted that the motives which impel a taxpayer to act, though
possibly of some evidentiary value in determining certain issues, are
not relevant to the ultimate issue of whether the taxpayer is entitled
to the tax benefits attained by his actions. For example, let us sup-
pose a rather unlikely situation outside of the field of income splitting,
in which a man and wife decide to have a child solely for the purpose
of obtaining an additional income tax exemption. Regardless of their
motive, the parents must undertake the additional expenses of support-
ing their newly-born child. It was in recognition of such additional
burdens on parents that Congress, in attempting to apportion the tax
burden as equitably as possible, passed exemptions for dependents.
Obviously the parents will be allowed an exemption regardless of their
motive, since the reason for the exemption does in fact exist. Exactly
the same reasoning should be applied to tax treatment of each of the
income splitting devices discussed in this note.
2. The Business Purpose or Substance-Sham Approach.-The second
235. Revenue Act of 1951 ch. 521, § 191, 65 Stat. 511.
236. See Paul, supra note 229.
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approach which has been employed in determining when to disallow
tax benefits produced by income splitting is based not upon the tax-
payer's intent or motive, but upon the "reality" or "substance" or
business function of the taxable entity formed to accomplish the
splitting of income. The rule under this approach is: Whenever
the income splitting device in question serves no legitimate business
function other than tax avoidance, it should be disregarded for tax
purposes, and the resulting tax benefits should be disallowed. This
is the approach implicit in the court-made "sham doctrine." Although
some courts have distinguished between the sham doctrine and the
business purpose doctrine, it is submitted that the differences are
illusory unless the business purpose doctrine is intepreted to refer
to the taxpayer's motive. In applying either of these doctrines to cases
involving income splitting devices, courts generally attempt to deter-
mine whether the additional tax entities are "shams not realities,
shadows and not substance."37 To make this rather vague determi-
nation, courts usually ascertain whether the entities perform any
non-tax business purpose, though, as stated above, many courts have
also tended to place unwarranted if not sole emphasis on the motives
of the taxpayer. We have seen instances in which the sham or
business purpose doctrine has been applied by courts to disallow tax
benefits accruing to multiple trusts, 23a gift and lease back transac-
tions,2 9 and multiple corporations.240
Another court-made rule which applies the "substance-sham ap-
proach" in a slightly different way is the Lucas v. Earl241 "assignment
of income doctrine." Lucas v. Earl held that mere assignment of
income is not sufficient to shift the incidence of income taxation.
The important principle of this case is that income must be taxed
to the one who earns it-if from services, to the one who performs
them, and if from property, to the property owner. Thus, the
approach is much like that of the business purpose or sham doctrine
in that it seeks to distinguish between the real and the sham income
earner on the basis of business realities.
The Lucas v. Earl application of the "substance-sham" approach
is reflected in section 704(e), which recognizes partners in a family
partnership formed by gifts of capital only when capital produces
a substantial amount of partnership income and the gift to the donee-
partner is complete. The two-pronged test of section 704(e) is mani-
237. Ibid.
238. Boyce v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. La.), aff'd per curlam, 296
F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1961), 46 Mxsi. L. REv. 1111 (1962).
239. Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
240. Supra note 203.
241. 281 U.S. 1116 (1930).
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festly designed to set out guidelines for determining when the
partner is "real" and when he is merely a "sham."
This approach is also reflected in section 482, which authorizes the
Commissioner to allocate "income, deductions, credits and allowances"
among related businesses "to. . . clearly reflect the income of such
... businesses."m As pointed out in Part II, a recent judicial inter-
pretation of this section has made it an important weapon against
multiple incorporation.A3
Evaluation.-The substance-form or business purpose approach
seems to be a more logical approach to the problem of determining
when to allow tax benefits accruing to multiple, related entities.
Unfortunately, experience has demonstrated that this approach yields
even greater uncertainty than the motive approach. As we have
seen, its most notable example is found in the court-made sham doc-
trine. The uncertainty and lack of uniformity produced by this
doctrine is not inherent, but stems largely from the vague language
of the courts which have applied it. Such vagueness has been caused
by a regrettable failure of analysis, leading Judge Hand to characterize
the reasoning of the "substance-sham" approach as "anodynes for the
pains of reasoning."m As long as judicial or statutory rules based
upon this approach give no objective definitive standards for deter-
mining "substance" or "business purpose," the taxpayer can frequently
enjoy the tax benefits accruing to multiple, related entities by simply
establishing apparent substantial business purposes to be performed
by the device in question.
The logic of this "substance-sham" approach is, however, some-
what stronger than the logic of the "taxpayer's motive" approach.
It seems pre-eminently logical that multiple, related entities formed
pursuant to any of the aforementioned income splitting devices which
serve no legitimate, non-tax purpose should not be entitled to the
tax benefits which would ordinarily accrue, on the simple ground
that the benefits were not intended for such "sham" transactions. The
reasoning of the courts, however, has rarely included a consideration of
whether Congress intended the tax benefits to be extended to the
transaction in question. Generally, as soon as the court finds that no
valid business purpose exists the tax benefits are automatically dis-
allowed. There is virtually no recognition of the fact that the mere
failure to serve business or even non-tax purposes does not necessarily
indicate that the device is entitled to no tax recognition. For example,
even though the gift and lease back device generally does not perform
242. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 482.
243. Supra note 199.
244. Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1932).
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a non-tax function, this fact alone does not indicate that the device is
unworthy of tax recognition. On the contrary, it is submitted that if
the requisite amount of the grantor's control over the trust property
is relinquished so as to shift the incidence of income taxation under the
statutory standards, then, by congressional standards,2 4 5 the device is
necessarily entitled to its desired tax effects.
3. Definite Standards Based Upon Congressional Intent.-The third
possible approach to the problem of tax avoidance via income splitting
is based upon determination of congressional intent in order to ascer-
tain whether multiple, related tax entities are entitled to the tax
benefits claimed. The rule under this approach is: Whenever it
appears that congressional federal tax policy is distorted by the accrual
of certain tax benefits to the multiple, related tax entities, then such
benefits should be disallowed. This approach is similar in many
respects to the second approach. But instead of basing allowance
or disallowance of tax benefits upon vague principles, it involves a
two-step process. First, the reasons initially prompting Congress to
create the tax benefits are ascertained. Second, definite, objective
standards are formulated for determining the circumstances under
which multiple, related entities may avail themselves of these benefits
and still be consistent with basic tax policy, as outlined by Congress'
purposes in establishing the benefits. These standards may then be
applied to the related entities in question to determine whether they
should be treated as separate entities (thus allowing the tax benefits)
or as a unit (thus disallowing the tax benefits).
This approach has rarely been used by either Congress or the courts
in attempting to solve the tax problems of income splitting. It is,
however, the general approach of the recent proposals for tax reform
by two noted experts.&2 46
The Advisory Group for Subehapter J, headed by Professor James
Casner recently devised legislation to combat the tax avoidance
aspects of multiple trusts.247 It proposed an objective guideline for
consolidation of multiple trusts, suggesting that all trusts created for
the "same primary beneficiary" be treated as a unit for purposes of
federal income taxation, with three minor exceptions. Presumably,
the basic premise of this proposal is that multiple trusts for the same
primary beneficiary were not intended to be the recipients of the
tax rates as the lowest end of our graduated tax rate structure.
245. See note 251 infra and accompanying text.
246. Professor James Casner, chairman of The Advisory Group for Subchapter J, and
Professor Stanley S. Surrey, chairman of the A.L.I. Tax Project.
247. Hearings on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapters C, J, and K
of Internal Revenue Code Before the Committee on Ways and Means, House Repre-
sentatives, 86th Cong., lst Sess. 247, 249, 263-71 (1959).
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Professor Stanley S. Surrey, head of the A.L.I. Tax Project, took
a similar approach in proposing legislative reform to correct the
tax avoidance possibilities of multiple incorporation.2 He deter-
mined that Congress passed the two main tax benefits accruing to
multiple corporations-the surtax exemption and the minimum ac-
cumulated earnings credit-in order to aid small businesses. There-
fore, congressional intent is distorted when these benefits accrue to
commonly-owned, multiple corporations. To avoid such distortion,
Professor Surrey set out objective guidelines for consolidating multiple
corporations for the limited purpose of disallowing multiple surtax
exemptions and accumulated earnings credits. These guidelines, it
will be remembered, are based principally upon the degree of common
ownership between the corporations. Like those standards set out
by the Advisory Group for consolidating multiple trusts, Professor
Surrey's guidelines were designed to restrict the tax benefits accruing
to multiple, related tax entities within the bounds of basic federal
tax policy.
Evaluation.-The third approach is one that, strangely has rarely
been used in actual practice in attempting to solve the tax problems
of income splitting. Thus, we cannot look to past experience to
determine the results of such an approach. However, the approach
taken by Congress in regulating family partnerships formed by gifts
of capital (section 704(e)), may give us some guidance. In section
704(e), reasonably definite standards, based upon "rules... generally
applicable to other forms of property"2 49 determine whether family
partners are to be accorded tax recognition. Application of this section
by the courts has yielded fairly consistent and certain results, effec-
tively eliminating the problem of tax avoidance via the family part-
nership. Since the third approach also involves application of objective
standards, it seems reasonable to believe that this approach can pro-
duce equal certainty and consistency. Also, it is submitted that
circumvention of definite, far-reaching standards would be much
more difficult than circumvention of the "subjective intent" approach
or "vague principles" approach. Presumably, if the taxpayer succeed-
ed in placing his income splitting transaction outside of the scope of
the standards set by the third approach, the transaction would, by
congressional definition of the tax policy on which the standards are
based, be entitled to the benefits. For example, applying Professor
Surrey's proposal, if the common ownership of a certain group of
multiple, subsidiary corporations were intentionally diluted below
eighty per cent, then each one would qualify for an additional surtax
248. Supra note 218.
249. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1951).
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exemption and minimum accumulated earnings credit, since each
would be sufficiently independent "small business" to become entitled
to the multiple tax benefits, consistent with Congress' intent.
As for the logic inherent in this third approach, it is the only one
that provides a truly rational basis for determining whether multiple,
related tax entities formed by income splitting devices are entitled
to tax recognition. In formulating definite standards based upon
a determination of who is to receive the various tax benefits, this third
approach most effectively prevents income splitting devices from being
used to distort basic federal tax policy.
B. Proposals for Limiting Income Splitting
This section will consist of a brief evaluation of present restrictions
upon tax avoidance capabilities of the income splitting devices dis-
cussed in Part II and recommendations for improvements. The
premise for this discussion is that the third approach to the problem
discussed above is the most effective and rational one. Thus, this
approach will be both a measure for the evaluation of present statutory
and judicial restrictions and a guideline for the proposed improve-
ments.
1. The Family Partnership.-As we have seen, the family partner-
ship is a device which may be created by transfers of capital to family
members in order to split business income and thus lower the total
taxes payable. Section 704(e) was designed to restrict the tax avoid-
ance capabilities of this device by setting up definite standards for
determining when the donee-partners are entitled to recognition for
tax purposes. The approach of this section is similar to the second
approach described above, in that it seeks to distinguish between
"sham" and "real" partners based upon the realities of the situation
after the transaction is completed. But it is also like the third approach
in that definite, legislative standards were formulated to aid courts in
making this distinction.
Section 704(e) has effectively regulated tax avoidance via the
family partnership since its passage in 1951. It seems logical that,
as this section provides, the true owner of the partnership capital
is entitled to become a partner regardless of how or why he acquired
the capital. The multitude of factors listed in the regulations to
determine whether the requisite degree of ownership exists,2 ° though
potentially a source of confusion, seems to have aided courts in apply-
ing this section to reach fairly consistent results. Resort to the regula-
tions could have been avoided by a more precise statutory definition,
250. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(2)(ii)(a),(c),(d)(1956); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)
(2) (iv),(vi), (x) (1956).
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however. Nevertheless, since section 704(e) has proved to be free
from substantial ambiguities, no need for changes is indicated.
One brief remark as to the tax treatment accorded to one of the
income splitting alternatives to the family partnership-the gift and
lease back devise-should be made at this point. The degree of
completeness required of a transfer of property for purposes of a
section 704(e) partnership is greater than that required under the
sections for determining the taxability of income to trust property.
For example, a transfer of property to a short term trust will not
qualify for a partnership interest under section 704(e), since the
beneficiary's interest in the business would be too limited for him to
be deemed a real partner. However, in the gift and lease back
situation, there is no reason why the donee should be required to have
the same powers and interests as those of a partner in order that
the transaction be recognized for tax purposes. In section 671-677,251
Congress defined the minimum degree of ownership of trust property
necessary to shift the income tax burden on the trust income. It is
submitted that these requirements should be determinative as to the
tax consequences of the gift and lease back device. Thus, if an
office building is transferred to a short term trust which satisfies the
requirements of sections 673(a) and 674(b)(2),22 the trust would
be taxed upon rental payments, and the taxpayer allowed to deduct
the reasonable rent paid as a business expense, regardless of the tax-
payer's rather obvious avoidance motives.
2. Multiple Corporations. The two sections most often invoked to
prevent unwarranted tax avoidance via multiple incorporation, sec-
tions 1551 and 691, base disallowance of tax benefits upon the deter-
mination of whether the taxpayer's motive was to attain these benefits.
As has been pointed out, this method has produced inconsistency
among court decisions as well as uncertainty among taxpayers. But
worse, this method is not even capable of rational results, since the
taxpayer's motive is not necessarily relevant to the issue of whether
multiple corporations are entitled to the various tax benefits intended
to aid small business. The second general method used to limit tax
avoidance by multiple incorporation is reallocation or consolidation
of income, either under section 482 or under the court-made "business
purpose" or "sham" doctrine. Although this method may provide a
more rational basis for determining when to disallow tax advantage,
its application has often been inconsistent and hopelessly vague.
These confusing restrictions suggest the need for legislation which
will give clear, certain, and rational guidelines for when to disallow
251. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-77.
252. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 173(a), 674(b) (2).
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the tax advantages of multiple corporations. It is submitted that
Professor Surrey's approach, which would apply definite standards by
which to consolidate multiple corporations for the purpose of dis-
allowing certain tax benefits, with the main purpose being to prevent
the benefits from being used to distort the congressional policy behind
the benefits, is an excellent guideline for filling this legislative void.
However, the scope of Professor Surrey's proposals should be expanded
in three areas.
First, Professor Surrey's approach should not be limited only to
the two major tax advantages of multiple incorporation. Legislation
should specifically state that corporations coming within the purview
of the statutory standards are to be consolidated for the purposes
not only of disallowing multiple surtax exemptions and accumulated
earnings credits, but also any other tax advantages intended to benefit
small business.
Second, as for legislative standards to define "multiple corporations"
for purposes of determining when the tax advantages should be
disallowed, Professor Surrey requires at least eighty per cent common
ownership of stock for both parent-subsidiary and brother-sister corpo-
rations.P The purpose of this eighty per cent standard is to give the
courts a definite guideline for determining to what degree related
corporations must be under independent control in order to be
entitled to small business tax benefits. It is submitted, however, that
the mere fact that common ownership among a group of related
corporations becomes diluted by more than twenty per cent is no
valid indication that each member of the group is therefore entitled
to small business tax benefits. It would seem that fifty per cent
common ownership of voting stock would be a more realistic standard,
particularly if one accepts the premise that the ultimate purpose
of these tax benefits is to promote business competition.2 4 In addition
to the stock ownership requirement, under Professor Surrey's proposals
the standard to be applied to brother-sister corporations requires
that the business of the corporations be integrated. Apparently the
reason that there is no integration of business requirement for parent-
subsidiary corporations is that it is presumed that the business of
subsidiary corporations is necessarily integrated with the parent's
business. On the ground that this requirement of integrated business
is too vague to be applied with any degree of certainty, it is suggested
that it would be both logical and administratively practicable if the
business of brother-sister corporations, with at least fifty per cent
253. Surrey, supra note 218, at 42.
254. The policy of promoting competition has been more clearly spelled out in other
legislation. See Small Business Act, 67 Stat. 232 (1953), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
63 (1958).
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common control among ten or fewer shareholders, were also con-
clusively presumed to be integrated.
Third, it is submitted that this proposed legislation should com-
pletely supersede sections 1551 and 691, since; as has been pointed
out, these sections are incapable of determining accurately when
multiple corporations should be entitled to tax benefits. Section 482
might be retained, but its application should be limited to situations
in which gross income, deductions, credits, and allowances to related
corporations which do not qualify for consideration under the
proposed legislation must be reallocated in order to reflect accurately
the income statement of any of these related corporations.
3. Multiple Trusts.-It has been pointed out that the principal tax
avoidance aspect of multiple trusts-accumulation of potentially high
bracket income in numerous low bracket trusts-is not directly re-
stricted by any tax legislation. Yet when income is accumulated in
numerous low bracket trusts set up by the same grantor for the
same beneficiary, the basic policy behind our graduated tax rate
structure is patently distorted. On this ground alone, the need for
restrictive legislation is manifest. We have examined in Part II
three possible solutions to this problem. The relative merits of these
solutions will be examined below.
First, some feel, on the basis of the recent Boyce case,2 5 that legis-
lation may not be needed, since broad judicial interpretation of the
sham doctrine could effectively prevent undue tax avoidance via
multiple trusts.25 6 This would be true if all instances of tax avoidance
via multiple trusts were as flagrant as in the Boyce case. But, as was
demonstrated in Part II, the sham doctrine is not only capable of
avoidance by careful tax planning, it is also so vague as to make
its application extremely uncertain.
The other two possible solutions are embodied in the two recent
legislative proposals examined in Part II: the ten year throwback
approach of the House Ways and Means Committee, and the Advisory
Group's consolidation approach, adopted by the Senate Finance Com-
mittee. Since only the consolidation approach prevents accumulation
of income in multiple trusts set up by one grantor for one beneficiary,
it is submitted that this is the one that should be adopted by Congress
in regulating this device.
The principle problem with the consolidation approach is similar
to the problem implicit in formulating legislation to restrict tax
advantages enjoyed by multiple corporations. The Advisory Group's
255. Supra note 238.
256. See, e.g., Somers, First Case on Multiple Trusts Suggests That Code Revision
May Not Be Needed, 14 J. TAxA-ON 363 (1961).
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answer is simply to consolidate all trusts created by the same grantor
in which "the primary beneficiary or beneficiaries are substantially
the same."257 This definition is not as definite as the proposed standard
for consolidating multiple corporations.218 The problem is whether it
can be applied with any degree of definiteness by the courts without
resulting in inequities. For example, if there are three accumulation
trusts created by the same grantor: the first for A, B, and C; the
second for A; and the third for B; it would seem that consolidation
of all three trusts and the subsequent higher tax rates, would be
prejudicial to C. Nevertheless, failure to consolidate the trusts allows
income to be accumulated for A and B at artificially low rates, prej-
udicing and distorting the aims of our graduated tax system.
In spite of the difficulties of applying and administering the Advi-
sory Group's proposals, their adoption would prevent what is unques-
tionably a great amount of undue tax avoidance. There are several
ways, however, in which it is believed that the Advisory Group's
proposals could be improved. First, the standard for consolidation
might be clarified by definitive examples of what constitutes "primary
beneficiaries" of a trust. One possible definition could be "any
beneficiary whose probability of receiving an interest in the accumu-
lated income of the trust exceeds fifty per cent," computed according
to actuarial tables. Second, since most of the inequities and difficul-
ties with this consolidation approach stem from trusts with multiple
beneficiaries, as in the example above, it is submitted that use of the
separate share concept259 might remove these difficulties. Using this
concept, when various trusts for multiple beneficiaries are consoli-
dated, the tax on each beneficiary's share would be computed
separately. Thus, in the example above, the consolidated income of
the three trusts would be segregated into three shares-one each for
A, B, and C-and the tax payable on the consolidated trust income
would equal the sum of the taxes payable on the three shares. This
provision would also eliminate the difficulties of determining when
beneficiaries of multiple trusts are "substantially the same." Third,
it is submitted that the Advisory Group's main exception to the rule
of consolidation (three trusts created at five year intervals) is unneces-
sary. Since the consolidation approach is based upon the premise that,
under our income tax system, multiple trusts created by the same
grantor for the same beneficiary ought to be treated as a unit for
income tax purposes, there is no logical reason to make exceptions
to the rule, even though the multiple trusts in question may have
been formed for entirely legitimate, non-tax reasons.
257. Hearings, supra note 247.
258. Surrey, supra note 218, at 42.
259. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 663(c).
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C. Conclusion
Restrictions imposed upon the tax avoidance capabilities of income
splitting devices have been haphazard and largely ineffective. The
first device examined-the family partnership formed by gifts of
capital-was at one time used to lower tax rates on high income even
when the incidents of ovnership and control over the property
transferred were substantially unchanged. Today, intelligent statu-
tory regulation based upon the basic tax policy of taxing the true
owner of the "tree" on the "fruits" of the "tree" restricts the taxes
saved by this device within the bounds of congressional tax policy.
The other two principal income splitting devices examined, how-
ever, are still definitely capable of distorting basic tax policy. The
multiple trust device can be used to lower the tax rates on potentially
high bracket income accumulated in several trusts for the same
beneficiary. Multiple corporations are capable of multiplying various
tax benefits intended for "small business" and placing them at the
disposal of "big business." It is submitted that Congress should
carefully regulate these devices in order to prevent such distortion
of tax policy. The general method submitted for regulating these
devices is: (1) to determine whether the tax advantages utilized by
each device distorts any well-defined tax policy; (2) guided by this
determination, to formulate definite standards for tax recognition of
related tax entities formed pursuant to the income splitting devices;
and (3) to consolidate for either specific or general income tax
purposes those related entities which fail to meet these standards.
Until income splitting devices are properly restricted, willful and
undue tax avoidance by high bracket tax payers will continue to
cause inequitable shifts in the tax burden, and various tax advantages
conferred by Congress will continue to be used to -undermine the
very ends they were intended to foster.
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